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Property, debt and interest

Property arose as the disposal of the non-user in parallel with and in place of possession as the disposal of the immediate user. If the origin of possession is to be sought in the possessor’s own labor, then the origin of property is to be sought in political and economic norms. Property arises as political property when one group of people is able to subjugate another group, when one part of the population rises as a political force over another part. Property makes it possible to create elaborate means of production, to invest on a large scale, to maintain a sufficient duration of the production and circulation, to calculate and distribute risks. If possession is a feature of a low composition of meaning, then political property is a feature of an activity with a high composition. Political property is associated with the rise of chiefdoms and states. Irrigation systems, military installations, massive ancient and medieval architecture are its material evidence.

“Thus, in tribal hydraulic societies property is simple, but it is simple with a specific tendency toward the predominance of political, power-based, property. This tendency increases with the size of the community. It becomes decisive in simple hydraulic commonwealths that are no longer directed by a primitive (tribal) government, but by a state” (Wittfogel 1957, p. 238).

Changes in the rate of surplus activity, in value saving and investment, draw a line between application, possession and property. The value of a surplus product is a “quantitative expression” of disposal and use: the transition from application to possession and from the latter to property is associated, first, with an increase in the size and rate of the surplus product, and, second, with a shift in the mechanisms of alienation and appropriation of the surplus product—from brute physical force to customs and from there to laws. Political ownership enables the appropriation of the surplus activity or its product in direct natural form—for example, in the form of corvée labor or rent in kind.

Simple self-reproduction is characterized by unstable accumulation. Periods in which increased surplus allows the large-scale making of means of production—irrigation systems, for example —are often followed by periods in which what has been achieved is consumed and destroyed. The very structure of the traditional order, with its political ownership, its communal and private possession, implies that investment is either reduced to the activity of the all-powerful king (or chief), who is unable to implement the many projects necessary for the division of meanings, or that investment is reduced to the petty activities of individuals and families who cannot raise enough funds for significant projects.

Appropriation in kind contains a contradiction in itself: on the one hand, it is a condition for the existence of the polity; but on the other hand, by appropriating labor or its product in kind, the polity hinders the development of a competitive commodity exchange. Overcoming this contradiction required the transformation of political or state property into economic or private property, the development of written laws, fiat money and interest.

Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger showed that debt and interest arise when possession turns into private property. In their view, possession is a physical or material concept, while property is an immaterial or legal concept:

“Possession always means the right to dispose of certain goods or resources and thus to use them physically, and is independent of whether property rights exist or not” (Heinsohn und Steiger 2009, p. 91). “Property never arises naturally. It can only be created by a legal, i.e., non-material action. Once property is created, it carries an unearned and intangible premium, the property premium. This premium exists in addition to the physical use of the goods or resources held and consists of two forces: (i) it is capable of supporting the issue of money, which can only be created in a loan agreement, and (ii) the right to this premium serves as collateral to obtain a loan” (ibid., p. 471).

Since its very inception, money has served the purpose of accumulation, i.e. saving and investing value. For a long time, this function was limited to precious metals as a tangible form of money. Fiat money emerged with the advent of credit. Medieval states needed money for their projects, especially to wage war and pay mercenary armies. They obtained money by borrowing it from creditors. However, political property is the prerogative of the state, and the sovereign often considered what he had borrowed as his property, i.e. he did not repay the debt. Creditors, suffering from the arbitrariness of the state, developed a new form of property—economic or private:

“Montesquieu describes here first how commerce was hampered by the prohibition of interest-taking by the church and was consequently taken up by the Jews; how the Jews suffered violence and constant extortions at the hands of nobles and kings; and how eventually they reacted by inventing the bill of exchange (lettre de change). The final portion of the chapter draws striking conclusions: ‘…and through this means commerce could elude violence, and maintain itself everywhere; for the richest trader had only invisible wealth which could be sent everywhere without leaving any trace. … In this manner we owe … to the avarice of rulers the establishment of a contrivance which somehow lifts commerce right out of their grip’” (Hirschman 1977, p. 72).

The transition from political to private property, i.e. the emergence of bills of exchange and the development of sovereign debt, led to monetary transactions as a special type of commodity transactions in which it is not goods that are traded, but money itself. The payment for money is interest.

“… Money as a whole takes on a very distinctive character in specific monetary transactions; that is, when it does not function as a medium of exchange to other objects, but as the central content, as the object of a transaction sufficient to itself. Money is an end in itself in the purely bilateral financial operation not only in the sense that it has suspended its qualities as a means, but also in the sense that it is, from the outset, the self-sufficient center of interest, which also develops its own distinctive norms and, at the same time, completely autonomous qualities and a corresponding technique” (Simmel 2004, p. 309).

Debt and interest commercialized traditional society. As more mercenaries were hired, the concept of wage activity spread. As products became commodities, consumers depended more on the market and monetary income than on subsistence production. As private property took hold, there was less room for communities or communal forms of possession. Robert Lane distinguished between warm and cold societies. He called societies based on emotional support, empathy and reciprocity “warm”, and societies based on impersonal relationships and money “cold”:

“From Marx and Engels’s statement that ‘no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, then callous cash-payment,’ to Tönnies’ ‘in Gesellschaft every person strives for that which is to his own advantage and affirms the action of others only in so far as and as long as they can further his interest,’ to Weber’s alleged movement from the communal relationship ‘based on the subjective feelings of parties… that they belong together,’ to the more impersonal interest-based associative relationship, to Sebastian de Grazia’s view that the contemporary commercial ‘competitive directive’ requires us to reduce all affective relationships, to Fromm who argues that capitalism at least, and perhaps all modernity, leads us to treat each other as machines—we find in all these sources and their many epigones expressed the idea of the modern cold society” (Lane 1978, p. 453).

A warm society is based on a material community: unity of place and time of life, joint action and joint possession of the basic conditions of life—a forest, a river, a field. Warm societies are those of personal communication, passion, repute and rumors. A cold society is based on an abstract community: the unity of socio-cultural order and ideas, that is, on impersonal communication, money and private property.

Historically, the more specialized the activity and the active power, the more fragmented the socio-cultural order is. This can be seen in the division of property rights. Internal effects are those results of an activity that are appropriated by the subject of the activity, and external effects (that is, externalities) are results that are appropriated by someone else. James Meade described externalities using the example of farmers who grow more apple trees and neighboring beekeepers who benefit from increased nectar sources. Increased sources are the external effects of the farmers’ activity on the beekeepers. This example shows that externalities occur when one economic unit benefits from the actions of another at no cost to itself. Meade called these the “unpaid factors of production” (Meade 1952, pp. 56-57). Externalities can be either positive (goods) or negative (evils).

In a traditional economy that was based on common possession, the growing of apple trees and the keeping of bees were combined within one unit. In this case, externalities did not arise or they were appropriated by the unit itself. An external effect occurs only when the farmer and the beekeeper run private enterprises, that is, when the rights to apple trees and the rights to bees are divided between them.

The beekeepers’ benefits can also be transformed into property rights if they have to pay for the use of the increased nectar sources. The increase in meanings requires as its condition the division of effects and property, but such a division in turn requires more complex cooperation and more complex administration: the evolution of private property shows that rights cannot be completely divided. There always remains an indivisible residual, resulting from the uncertainty of the environment, from the fact that such a division itself requires expenditure.

3. Limits of simple self-reproduction

Adaptive efficiency and the race against uncertainty

Man lives under uncertainty, unpredictability of events; his activities are aimed at overcoming uncertainty, at ensuring that reality serves human needs and that needs correspond to reality. Unpredictability arises from the action of natural forces and other people, as well as man himself: sometimes man surprises himself. Armen Alchian suggested starting with the uncertainty of the environment and human motives when building an economic model:

“It is straightforward, if not heuristic, to start with complete uncertainty and nonmotivation and then to add elements of foresight and motivation in the process of building an analytical model. The opposite approach, which starts with certainty and unique motivation, must abandon its basic principles as soon as uncertainty and mixed motivations are recognized” (Alchian 1950, p. 221).

However, the approach that starts with uncertainty does not consider that the entire coevolution of humans and meanings is directed towards overcoming it. “…Humans have a ubiquitous drive to make their environment more predictable” (North 2005, p. 14). Culture-society never acts in a state of complete uncertainty, as it always has a certain stock of meanings. Humans resolve uncertainty through meanings and bear the associated costs. In other words, the amount of uncertainty that must be eliminated from an event in order to obtain a fact can be measured by the cost of action. To understand what costs must be expended, we can refer to the five types of uncertainty identified by Douglas North:

“1. Uncertainty that can be reduced by increasing information given the existing stock of knowledge. 2. Uncertainty that can be reduced by increasing the stock of knowledge within the existing institutional framework. 3. Uncertainty that can be reduced only by altering the institutional framework. 4. Uncertainty in the face of novel situations that entails restructuring beliefs. 5. Residual uncertainty that provides the foundation for ‘non-rational’ beliefs” (North 2005, p. 17).

Accordingly, several types of costs can be distinguished. First, there are technological / transformation costs. As we have seen, people discover patterns in the natural and cultural environment (habitat and domus) through causal models, that is, knowledge. Current technological expenses reduce the uncertainty within the existing knowledge stock. But sometimes, to reduce uncertainty, it is necessary to increase the stock of knowledge, that is, to invest in technology.

In addition to technological costs, there are inevitably costs for coordinating activities and making decisions. We call them organizational and psychological costs, respectively. Organizational expenses and investments are losses caused by distrust and injustice, which require activities to create and maintain institutions and change the existing institutional framework. Psychological costs are losses caused by prejudice, false beliefs and indecision, which require actions to change the belief structure, motivate and stimulate.

Organizational and psychological costs thus differ from technological costs. In the new institutional economics, organizational and psychological costs are summarized under the term transaction costs. Although transaction costs are defined as the costs of running institutions, they also include the costs of decision-making (cf. Coase 1988, p. 6; Richter and Furubotn 2005, p. 12). In what follows, we will always keep this dual nature of transaction costs in mind.

“Residual uncertainty” that cannot be eliminated by spending and investing is the basis for irrational beliefs and profits. Uncertainty has a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a necessary condition for the existence of profit. If everyone knew everything, no one could make a profit. On the other hand, “in the presence of uncertainty—a necessary condition for the existence of profits—there is no meaningful criterion for selecting the decision that will ‘maximize profits’” (Alchian 1950, p. 212). Profits are always based on chance and their size is always random.

Profit is an uncertainty that is integrated as an inherent part in the process of self-reproduction of culture-society; therefore profit is also a meaning. Like any meaning, profit cannot always be “maximized” here and now: for its maximization, decisions by individuals are not enough, but socio-cultural evolution is required:

“There is an alternative method which treats the decisions and criteria dictated by the economic system as more important than those made by the individuals in it. By backing away from the trees—the optimization calculus by individual units—we can better discern the forest of impersonal market forces. This approach directs attention to the interrelationships of the environment and the prevailing types of economic behavior which appear through a process of economic natural selection. Yet it does not imply that individual foresight and action do not affect the nature of the existing state of affairs” (Alchian 1950, p. 213).

Hence, the self-reproduction of culture-society is built upon both certainty and uncertainty. The process of production, circulation and consumption of goods is a process of overcoming uncertainty. At the same time, as Robert Sapolsky shows, uncertainty is the very condition that makes cooperation between people possible. The prisoner’s dilemma can only be solved on the assumption that the players do not know how many rounds the game will have and therefore behave irrationally (Sapolsky 2017, p. 634).

In the space between certainty and uncertainty, there arises probability (risk). Probability should not be confused with either necessity or accident. According to Keynes’s famous definition, which borrowed from Knight, an event is uncertain if there is no basis for calculating the chances of its occurrence or non-occurrence; in contrast, a probable event is an event whose chances can be calculated (Keynes 2013, vol. 14, pp. 113-114).

Probability lies between necessity and accident. Unlike strict necessity, it is variable. However, unlike accident, it is finitely variable. Profit is an accident, while cost is a necessity. In between lies probability, or interest. Property and interest have the same root, they are interrelated results of an increase in meanings, the gradual transformation of uncertainty into risk and the division of rights and risks. In the early stages of their evolution in a traditional culture-society, profit and interest are almost equally uncertain: the amount of interest roughly corresponds to the amount of expected profit. The evolution of interest led to its decline in relation to profit. This expresses the nature of interest and property—it is part of the uncertainty that can be transformed into risk.

The transformation of uncertainty into risk and then into certainty occurs in the process of activity—that is learning and imitation, trial and error. During socio-cultural evolution, a “double adaptation” occurs: men adapt to the environment by changing meanings, and meanings adapt to the environment by changing men. The quality of this mutual adaptation is determined by the effectiveness of feedback. People learn when they receive rapid and frequent feedback on their actions—be it making things, keeping promises, or discovering new laws of nature. Learning occurs through the repetition of events and actions, the formation of stable meanings—norms or routines. The efficiency of adaptation depends on the norms that regulate the activities of the culture-society, that is, on the socio-cultural order:

“Adaptive efficiency, on the other hand, is concerned with the kinds of rules that shape the way an economy evolves through time. It is also concerned with the willingness of a society to acquire knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake risk and creative activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and bottlenecks of the society through time. We are far from knowing all the aspects of what makes for adaptive efficiency, but clearly the overall institutional structure plays the key role in the degree that the society and the economy will encourage the trials, experiments, and innovations that we can characterize as adaptively efficient” (North 1990, pp. 80-81).

Culture and meanings emerged as a means of overcoming the uncertainty of the natural environment, the mutual inadaptation of habitat and protohumans. As an adaptation process, cultural evolution reduced natural uncertainty, leading to the emergence of an agrarian culture-society with its traditional order, possession and political ownership. However, the same cultural evolution has led to an increase in the uncertainty of the domus, the culture itself. The more complex the culture, the more variable it is. The more information, the higher the uncertainty: the random grows faster than the probable:

“On the other hand, a string is random if there is no short way to describe it. Of course, you can always describe a binary string just by listing it: the program that says “Print s, then halt.” That program has about the same length as s itself. Therefore, s is random if there is no shorter way than that to describe it. K(s), in other words, is about equal to the length of s: K(s) ≈ L(s). This definition of randomness has nothing to do with probability. Indeed, Kolmogorov believed that the idea of information was more fundamental than the idea of probability” (Schumacher 2015, pp. 231-232).

By multiplying meanings, culture-society raises randomness and uncertainty. The increasing complexity of human activities is a race against uncertainty. By complicating their activities, humans eliminate the uncertainty that prevents them from satisfying their needs, but in doing so they create even greater uncertainty. To eliminate this new uncertainty, they must complicate their activities even more. This phenomenon is called the “Red Queen’s Race”:

“This concept, that all progress is relative, has come to be known in biology by the name of the Red Queen, after a chess piece that Alice meets in Through the Looking-Glass, who perpetually runs without getting very far because the landscape moves with her. It is an increasingly influential idea in evolutionary theory. The faster you run, the more the world moves with you and the less you make progress” (Ridley 2003, p. 18).

The race against uncertainty meant that traditional culture-society gradually reached the technological, organizational and psychological limits of simple self-reproduction. When it went beyond these limits, it either collapsed, disintegrated and lost complexity (which often happened) or had to change its foundations.