Читать книгу: «Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked»
ibidem Press, Stuttgart
Inhaltsverzeichnis
List of Figures and Tables
Abbreviations
Introduction
1. An Institutional Approach to Ethnic Conflicts
1.1 The debate—institutionalists and their opponents
1.2 A historical “autopsy”—explaining the demise of SFRY
1.3 The Bulgarian ethnic models
1.4 Contemporary challenges to ethnic relations
1.5 Strength of state institutions and ethnic conflicts
2. The Role of Political Parties
2.1 The contemporary party systems in Bulgaria
2.1.1 Bipolarity (1990–2001)
2.1.2 Polycentrism, populism, and nativism (2001 until present)
2.2 MRF—electoral support and ideology
2.3 The Bulgarian PRR
2.3.1 Representatives
2.3.2 Origins, ideology, development
2.3.3 The PRR and the Bulgarian ethnic model
2.3.4 A glimpse into the future of the PRR
2.4 Roma, crime and politics
3. Channeling Ethnic Conflicts
3.1 The integration policies of Bulgarian governments after 1989
3.2 The legislation and the judicial system
3.2.1 General framework for analysis
3.2.2 The PADA
3.2.2.1 Purpose and concept
3.2.2.2 Scope
3.2.2.3 Genuine and determining occupational requirements
3.2.2.4 Positive action
3.2.2.5 Minimum requirements and protection of rights
3.2.2.6 Burden of proof and victimization
3.2.2.7 Dissemination of information and social dialogue
3.2.2.8 Equality body
3.2.2.9 Compliance and sanctions
3.3 Discrimination against Roma ethnic group: case studies
3.3.1 Segregation
3.3.2 Use of excessive force by the police and lack of effective investigation
3.3.3 Hate crimes
Conclusion: A Story about Garbage Trucks
References
Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
Copyright
To my daughter Elena
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
1. Discrimination against Roma here
2. The scope of state functions here
3. Strength of state institutions and scope of state functions here
4. Comparison between six states in 2013, based on WGI (Graph View) here
5. Votes for the MRF in the elections for BNA, 1991–2014 here
6. Fears of the MRF voters here
7. Votes for the main PRR parties here
8. Votes for Ataka, NFSB, and MRF in the parliamentary
elections (2005, 2009, 2013, 2014) here
9. Social distances (2016) here
10. Social distances (2008 and 2016) here
11. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—thefts here
12. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups
—robberies here
13. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—premeditated murders here
14. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—
batteries here
15. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—rapes here
16. Social distances. “Do you agree or disagree with each of
the following statements?” here
Tables
1. Main ethnic groups in Bulgaria since 1878 here
2. Main sources of income for Roma households here
3. Comparison between six states in 2013, based on WGI here
4. Control of corruption in six states in 1996, 2003, 2008, 2013 here
5. Ethnic profile of the political parties in the Bulgarian
National Assembly in 2009 here
6. Crimes and Roma suspects here
7. Number of complaints lodged with the Commission for Protection Against Discrimination per year here
8. Use of force by the Bulgarian police by years here
Abbreviations
| Abbreviations of political parties and organizations | |||
| Abbreviation in English | Full name of the organization in English | Abbreviation in Bulgarian | Full name of the organization in Bulgarian |
| ABR | Alternative for Bulgarian Revival | АБВ | Алтернатива за българско възраждане |
| ASP | Alternative Socialist Party | АСП | Алтернативна социалистическа партия |
| BAPU | Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union | БЗНС | Български земеделски народен съюз |
| BAPU “Nikola Petkov” | Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union “Nikola Petkov” | БЗНС “Никола Петков” | Български земеделски народен съюз “Никола Петков” |
| BAPU “United” | Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union “United” | БЗНС “Обединен” | Български земеделски народен съюз “Обединен” |
| BDF | Bulgarian Democratic Forum | БДФ | Български демократичен форум |
| BEL | Bulgarian European Left | БЕЛ | Българска евролевица |
| BNRP | Bulgarian National Radical Party | БНРП | Българска национално-радикална партия |
| BNU | Bulgarian National Union | БНС | Български народен съюз |
| BSDP | Bulgarian Social Democratic Party | БСДП | Българска социалдемократическа партия |
| BSP | Bulgarian Socialist Party | БСП | Българска социалистическа партия |
| DLP | Democratic Labor Party | ДПП | Демократична партия на труда |
| DOST | Democrats for Responsibility Solidarity and Tolerance | ДОСТ | Демократи за отговорност свобода и толерантност |
| DROM | Movement for an Equal Public Model | ДРОМ | Движение за равноправен обществен модел |
| FF | Fatherland Front | ОФ | Отечествен фронт |
| IMRO–BNM | IMRO–Bulgarian National Movement | ВМРО–БНД | ВМРО–Българско Национално Движение |
| MBC | Movement “Bulgaria of the Citizens” | ДБГ | Движение “България на гражданите” |
| MRF | Movement for Rights and Freedoms | ДПС | Движение за права и свободи |
| NCPPI | National Committee for Protection of Peoples’ Interests | ОКЗНИ | Общонароден комитет за защита на националните интереси |
| NFSB | National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria | НФСБ | Национален фронт за спасение на България |
| NMSP | National Movement for Stability and Progress | НДСВ | Национално движение за стабилност и възход |
| ODS | United Democratic Forces | ОДС | Обединени демократични сили |
| OLJ | Order, Legality, and Justice | РЗС | Ред, законност и справедливост |
| PPFD | Peoples’ Party “Freedom and Dignity” | НПСД | Народна партия “свобода и достойнство” |
| PROUD | People for Real, Open and United Democracy | ГОРД | Гражданско обединение за реална демокрация |
| PU | People’s Union | НС | Народен Съюз |
| TNLMB | Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria | ТНОДБ | Турско национално-освободително движение в България |
| UBNL | Union of Bulgarian National Legions | СБНЛ | Съюз на българските национални легиони |
| UDF | United Democratic Forces | СДС | Съюз на демократичните сили |
| UDF Center | Union of the Democratic Forces “Center” | СДС “Център” | Съюз на демократичните сили “Център” |
| UFD | Union of Free Democrats | ССД | Съюз на свободните демократи |
| UNPP | United National Progressive Party | ОНПП | Обединена национално прогресивна партия |
| UNS | Union for National Salvation | ОНС | Обединение за национално спасение |
| UYNL | Union of Youth National Legions | СМНЛ | Съюз на младежките национални легиони |
| Other important abbreviations | |||
| Abbreviation in English | Full name in English | Abbreviation in Bulgarian | Full name in Bulgarian |
| BHC | Bulgarian Helsinki Committee | БХК | Български хелзинкски комитет |
| BNA | Bulgarian National Assembly | НС | Народно събрание на Република България |
| CEC | Central Electoral Commission | ЦИК | Централна избирателна комисия |
| CPAD | Commission for Protection against Discrimination | КЗД | Комисия за защита от дискриминация |
| ECHR | European Convention on Human Rights | ECHR | Европейска конвенция по правата на човека |
| ECtHR | European Court of Human Rights | ЕСПЧ | Европейски съд по правата на човека |
| FYROM | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | – | – |
| GSI | Global Slavery Index | – | – |
| NAP-DRI | National Action Plan for the pan-European Initiative “Decade of Roma Inclusion” | НПД-ДРВ | Национален план за действие по инициативата “Десетилетие на ромското включване” |
| NCCEDI | National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Demographic Issues | НССЕДВ | Национален съвет за сътрудничество по етническите и демографските въпроси |
| NCCEII | National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Integration Issues | НССЕИВ | Национален съвет за сътрудничество по етническите и интеграционните въпроси |
| NCEDI | National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues | НСЕДВ | Национален съвет по етническите и демографските въпроси |
| PADA | Protection against Discrimination Act | ЗЗД | Закон за защита от дискриминация |
| PRR | Populist Radical Right | – | – |
| SAC | Supreme Administrative Court | ВАС | Върховен административен съд |
| SANS | State Agency National Security | ДАНС | Държавна агенция национална сигурност |
| SFRY | Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia | – | – |
| WGI | Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank) | – | – |
Introduction
The relative ethnic peace which Bulgaria has enjoyed in the recent decades is among the few remaining bastions of national self-confidence. Amid bitter antagonism, bloodshed, and financial crises, which devastated many countries after the collapse of the Communist bloc, the sanctity of interethnic accord has, in general, been revered in Bulgaria. Its preservation is possible because the political system, despite its multiple drawbacks, is still able to tame the flashing sparks. Not only the limited comprehensive research on the topic but also the current affairs testify to the relevance of this book, dedicated to the role of political institutions in ethnic conflicts in Bulgaria after 1989. As I am writing these lines, Lyutvi Mestan, the leader of the newly formed ethnic party Democrats for Responsibility Solidarity and Tolerance (DOST),1 states that the amendment of the Election Code,2 which the majority in the Bulgarian National Assembly (BNA) approved on April 28, 2016, “is a continuation of the Revival Process.”3 The events in Katunitsa, Orlandovtsi, Garmen, and Radnevo indicate that the clashes and physical violence between Bulgarians and Romani, who remain subjected to social exclusion and marginalization, are on the raise. In addition, there are numerous other less visible and often ignored outbursts of hostility on ethnic grounds which happen on a daily basis. The issues discussed in the pages that follow are even more pertinent when we consider the international context. The principles and values on which the European Union (EU) is built are challenged by the constant migrant flow from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other failing states. At the same time, the increasingly menacing shadow of terrorism revealed its poisonous tentacles in the attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Burgas (2012), Paris (2015), Brussels, Istanbul, Nice, Würzburg, Ansbach, Munich, and Berlin (2016).
The subject of this study is the way the political institutions manipulate the ethnic conflicts during the past 27 years. Political institutions are relatively durable and sustainable social groupings or structures operating under statutory or common rules and regulatory systems that are responsible for the political process (March and Olsen 2008: 3).4 In a narrow sense, to them pertain the institutions forming the backbone of the state which are at the core of the political process and are empowered, whenever appropriate, to apply coercion—the parliament, the government, the judiciary bodies, the public administration, etc. In a broad sense to them must be added the political institutions-intermediaries5 as well as the institutions that postulate the norms of social behavior such as the constitution and electoral law. In order to achieve optimal heuristic value the analysis will be limited to the political parties, the parliament, the government, the judiciary, and the relevant legislative framework. I will not dwell on the role of the presidential institution or the media. The impact of the tidal wave of migrants from failed states and the threats to national security posed by terrorism are also not going to be examined. Furthermore, I have purposefully not included a full-blown geopolitical analysis. This does not mean that, for example, the neo-Ottoman doctrine of the Turkish President Recep Erdogan and the hybrid propaganda, employed by the Kremlin and the traditionalist values defended by the Russian diplomacy, in the concept of “Conservative Revolution” which seeks natural allies in the populist radical right (PRR) and left parties in the EU,6 are not relevant to this study (Koritarov 2016, Minchev 2016, Vasilev 2016). However, in order to make my task more realistic and manageable, I decided not to incorporate at length these issues in the project.7
I have also resisted the temptation to draw parallels between the Bulgarian case and the ethnic issues on the Balkan Peninsula as a whole or, even still, between the ethnic conflicts in this country and those in polities across Europe. At first glance, the reasons for such comparisons are compelling. For example, not unlike the ethnic formations in Bulgaria, the ethnic parties in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)8 play a significant role in its political system.9 To go even further, at present, journalists persistently bring forward the question of the rights of the “Bulgarian minority” in Albania; others, who discuss the dramatic events surrounding the Catalan independence referendum which took place on October 1, 2017, juxtapose the Revival Process in Bulgaria with the policies of “el Caudillo de la Última Cruzada y de la Hispanidad”10 Francisco Franco (1892–1975) toward the Basques.11 Although I am familiar with the ethnic relations in other Balkan countries, as well as the ethnopolitical issues in EU in general, I have to admit that I am by no means a pundit in all of them. The real danger here is that, at the end, I could inadvertently open a can of worms. It could be detrimental to the project if I embark on the perilous journey of drawing such parallels throughout the book. For these reasons, the only in-depth comparison that I explore in detail is between the Bulgarian ethnic models and the former Yugoslav federation.12
I do not believe that conflicts are necessarily something “evil,” or that they should be avoided at all costs. As it was famously pointed out by Ralf Dahrendorf, they may be beneficial to society (Dahrendorf 1959, 2007). The latter could not survive without both consensus and conflict.13 In my view, however, conflicts become particularly dangerous and volatile whenever they stem from politicized ethnic identity14 coupled with unsuccessful attempts at their institutionalization. My scientific curiosity has been provoked by such problematic cases and the consequences that they have for the Bulgarian political system and society. It is equally important to clarify (my take on) some other terms used in this study. Ethnic identity is the sense of belonging to a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland, and a sense of solidarity (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 4–6, Limenopoulou 2004: 2). A minority ethnic group is any ethnic group in a given society that forms an appreciable subsystem with limited access to roles and activities central to the economic and political institutions of the society (Shermerhorn 1996: 18). By “ethnic party,” I understand a political party, the majority of whose constituents belong to one or more ethnic minorities. An “ethnic entrepreneur” is a person (typically a politician) who voices and uses the interests, everyday challenges, and fears of a particular ethnic group (or groups) in order to mobilize political support for a certain cause.
The structure of the project corresponds to the facets of the subject. The first part necessarily begins with an adjustment of “the optics” through which the analysis will be performed. In a dynamic and interdisciplinary field, such as the study of ethnic conflicts, there is a lot of controversy regarding the notions and methods of investigation. There are, as well, disagreements on the use and content of the conceptual apparatus. The advantages of an institutional approach to conflicts, which I use in this work, are illustrated mainly through the means of the exploration of the tragic demise of the Yugoslav federation. The study of ethnic relations in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the mistakes of the political elites in particular, is an invaluable lesson stimulating the better understanding of our own country. Using this study as a starting point of the analysis of the Bulgarian case, I then pinpoint the specifics of contemporary challenges in front of ethnic relations in Bulgaria. The second part examines the role of political parties both outside and inside the parliament. I trace the developments of the ethnic model in its interconnection with the first and the second party systems. I highlight the particularities in ideology, political support, and mobilization of the main ethno-political formation—the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), as well as of the representatives of the PRR. Last but not least, I discuss various case studies on Roma, crime and politics. The third part of the book is devoted to the integration policies of Bulgarian governments after 1989, especially those that are targeted toward Roma. I assess the role of the judicial system and the antidiscrimination legislation.
There is a plethora of explanatory concepts about the nature and causes of ethnic conflicts. The “classic” schools of thought are the primordialist (Geertz 1973), the instrumentalist (A. Smith 1986), and the constructivist (Anderson 2006). Scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insights from all of these schools. Significant approaches, some of which are influenced or related to the three fundamental paradigms, are the institutionalist (Lijphart 1968, 1977, McGarry and O’Leary 1993, Crawford and Lipschutz 1998, Hechter 2000, Osipov 2013),15 the environmental (or economic, which can be derived from, for example, Marxism), the ethnocultural (MG Smith 1969), and the theory of modernization (Horowitz 1985, Altermatt 1998).16 An “army” of scholars has examined ethnic relations in Bulgaria: political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, historians, ethnographers, economists, philosophers, and others. Nonetheless, there is a relative lack of comprehensive studies dedicated entirely to the role of political institutions for deterrence and/or incitement of ethnic conflicts during the last 27 years. Instead, these issues are discussed in chapters or sections of monographs and compendiums (e.g., Kertikov et al. 1990, Makariev 1999, 2017, Hopken 2000, Dimitrov 2001, Dronzina 2004, Mizov 2008, Engström 2009, Karasimeonov 2010, Zlatanova 2013) and, above all articles that highlight specific aspects of the problem, for example, the link between political parties and ethnic conflicts (Smilov 2006, 2007, 2008, Kabakchieva 2008, Todorov 2012), the Bulgarian ethnic models (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002, 2003, Mitev 2005, Bosakov 2006, Pamporov 2008, Geiselmann and Karamelska 2010), the integration policies targeting minorities (Grekova 2008, Gulubov 2008, Ivanov 2008, Rechel 2008), etc. For example, although the important recent book by Plamen Makariev—The Public Legitimacy of Minority Claims—explores the Bulgarian case as well, its scope is much more ambitious and broader17 than the purpose of mine. Makariev’s work is a study of public policies concerning the national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it analyses these policies through the means of political philosophy, in particular through the prism of “the Habermasian version of the theory of public deliberation and the model of deliberative democracy” (Makariev 2017: 9).
Of importance for the better grasp of the questions that my work attempts to answer are studies of nationalism (Kabakchieva 2006), postcommunist politicization of the religious (Krasteva 2015), ethnic identity (Mizov 2003, Nedelcheva 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010, Bosakov 2004, Ahmed 2008, Nedelcheva and Topalova 2010) and ethnic relations (Mitev 1994, Zografova 1996, Genov 2004, 2005, Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007, Pamporov 2012), practices of controlled voting (Bezlov and Gounev 2012b, Stoychev 2016), economic dimensions of the Revival Process (Avramov 2017), public spheres in Bulgaria and Serbia (Dawson 2014), etc. An imposing amount of academic research illuminates the actions of political institutions in the conflicts that marked the breakup of former Yugoslavia and the constitutional crisis in Macedonia (Flere 1991, Vukovic 1997, Crawford and Lipschutz 1998, Hinkova 1998, Arsenova and Kertikov 2002, 2003, Todorov 2002, Dronzina 2004, Garabedian 2007, Detrez and Segaert 2008, Banchev 2009, Minchev 2009).
The precise meaning and place of the “Bulgarian ethnic model” in the political system has been a constant object of heated debates and discussions not only in the scientific community but also in the public sphere. In my opinion, although undoubtedly charged ideologically, the term is not void of content or a shallow description of a myth. In fact, several such models operated since the Liberation in 1878 (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). Their apex has been in 1940s, when the decisive intervention of the institutions (the monarch, the parliament, and the Bulgarian Patriarchate) led to the Rescue of Bulgarian Jews from deportation (Bar Zohar 1998, Todorov 2001, Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). In my view, generally speaking, the model aims to guarantee the rights and freedoms of all ethnic and confessional communities. It has two elements, a dynamic one, as well as another which is much more stable. Its main building blocks are a legislative framework, which obviously changed through the years, and the specifics of Bulgarian political culture. I believe that the model not only reflects the idiosyncrasies of the latter but also influences it. The essence of the Bulgarian ethnic model(s) is not merely a combination of policy measures or a modus operandi of particular institutions. In fact it could be independent of or even “act” against the normative framework which the state imposes on society. This approach is confirmed by the fact that even during the Revival Process (1984–89),18 Bulgarian Turks and Roma, “manifesting wisdom and understanding,”19 accepted that this policy was not instigated or supported by the ethnic majority. Thus the amicable, neighborly relations between ethnic Bulgarians and minorities were, as a whole, preserved in spite of the discriminative and violent actions that the state undertook (Kertikov et al. 1990). The ambivalence of the term “ethnic model,” a phenomenon of the political culture and an institutional mechanism for the integration of ethnic communities, is expressed as well in the political rhetoric.20
When they discuss the political system, most scholars do not perceive or outline an immediate threat to the nonviolent relations between the ethnic groups. During the first decade after the beginning of transition to a democratic political system, in particular, there was a consensus among mainstream political parties, on the necessity of preserving the ethnic peace. This tacit agreement is enshrined in the Constitution of Bulgaria from July 13, 1991, as well as in the legislation as a whole. Using the examples of Bulgaria and Macedonia, Jenny Engström claims that democratization can prevent violent conflict in ethnically divided societies (Engström 2009, 2014). Engström’s analyses contain many indispensable insights into Bulgaria’s road to democracy. However she does not compare the current ethnic model with its “predecessors.” Engström paints an overly optimistic picture of the contemporary model that overlooks some of its important flaws, development, and deterioration.21
Many scientists and human rights activists hold that integration policies of Bulgarian government targeting minorities, especially those that relate to the Roma, failed to produce any significant outcomes (Grekova 2008, Rechel 2008). In addition to that, the inability of the state to combat crime has direct repercussions on ethnopolitics. The minorities, Roma and Turks in particular, are most vulnerable when it comes to the practices of control over voting (Stoychev 2016: 16, 25). Many political parties attempt to coerce and/or to manipulate constituencies to give them their unreserved support in the elections, but the ethnic formation MRF is a sui generis leader in these illegal practices (ibid.: 51, 54). Political parties work together with organized crime in order to place voters under control (ibid.: 24).
The analysis of the relationship between political institutions and ethnicity reveals that the state cannot be a source of ethnicity (Dronzina 2004: 136). In ethnically heterogeneous Balkan societies “ethnicity is a source of legitimacy of the state and a power resource”22 (ibid.). The relatively stable proportions between the variables related to ethnicity23 are conducive to the better accommodation of ethnic communities, even when the institutions are severely weakened and damaged, as was the case between 1992 and the spring of 1997 (Dronzina 2004: 134, 136). This conclusion, however, has been disputed by the PRR. In 2016, the presidential nominee of the United Patriots and leader of Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)—Krasimir Karakachanov—warned24 about the dangerous “Islamization of Bulgaria” and the potential for it to transform into a “Gipsy State” (Offnews.bg 2016). In response to such fears, skillfully ignited by politicians, scholars point to the fact that, for example, Bulgarian Turks have been loyal to Bulgarian state for decades (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). The predominant majority of the ethnic Turks living in the country are Sunnis. Unlike Albanian Islamists in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania “most of them are not involved in large-scale criminal activities”; the MRF never had separatist ambitions nor it intended to make Bulgaria a “binational state”; Bulgarian Roma have relatively limited political claims—the problems and objectives that they voice are primarily economic (ibid.). For these reasons, the implementation of a “Kosovo scenario” on Bulgarian territory is highly unlikely (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002).
The beginning of the new millennium was marked by significant changes in Bulgaria’s party system that had repercussions on the ethnic relations (Smilov 2007, 2008). PRR parties such as Ataka, which entered the political scene in 2005, bluntly defied the unwritten rules of transition and started a fierce crusade against the “privileges” of minorities (Smilov 2008: 50). At present the party system is in the stage of cartel, a situation that can be observed in many European countries (ibid.: 39–40). Caught in an ideological vacuum, more parties may decide to mobilize the electorate through radicalization of their messages. An extreme radicalization can take the shape of an acute attack on “human rights and the rule of law, especially the protection of minorities” (Smilov 2008: 41). The contemporary Bulgarian nationalism, according to some scholars, is not aggressive (Nedelcheva 2007: 113). It does not rely on the condition that proponents must identify with the state—the individual vision for Bulgaria (i.e., what the country represents) is in fact mostly limited to family values, friends, and birthplace (ibid.). However a retreat in the family life, a barricading, or entrenchment in the home space pose the threat of re-ethnicizing of nationalism—such a trend is observed mostly among Bulgarians and Turks and, to a lesser extent, among Roma (Kabakchieva 2008: 94). From this perspective, under such circumstances, other ethnic groups may begin to look “foreign” and “dangerous,” and, ultimately, to become “enemies.” This process can lead to the resuscitation of “traumatic nationalism of survival,” which then will channel ethnic strife. Between 15% and 20% of Bulgarian citizens would support a patriotic party that bases its propaganda on constant reminders to the public of the glorious pages of Bulgarian history, the national ideals, and, possibly, a protectionist economic policy (ibid.: 94). Such a party would have to compete primarily with parties like GERB25 and Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), whose electorates share such values. It would neither endanger the niche of aggressive nationalism, occupied by parties like the Bulgarian National Union (BNU), nor threaten the existence of Ataka, since the latter is concerned mostly with a criticism of corrupt elites and the injustices brought by the transition to democracy rather than with purely nationalistic goals and values (Kabakchieva 2008: 94–5).
Several hypotheses lie at the heart of this work. The first is that the contemporary Bulgarian ethnic model is not a fixed political construct, as it is often perceived, but underwent significant developments in the last 27 years. Thus far the political system is able to prevent the occurrence of serious ethnic conflicts. The integration measures undertook by the government notwithstanding, various studies bespeak that the social distances between the main ethnicities in Bulgaria are increasing (Pamporov 2008, 2016).26 The second hypothesis reads that the political system reflects the interests of minority ethnic groups in a mostly superficial way that typically not only does not exceed but is below the minimal standards. Many of the Roma, for example, live in conditions that are often indistinguishable from modern forms of slavery. The political institutions are unwilling to commit to tangible, real integration measures due to the resistance toward distributive justice which the predominant part of Bulgarians display when the target or the beneficiaries of such measures are minorities.
The third hypothesis postulates that political populism thriving as a result of the impotence of the “old” ideologies and convergence of left and right can give birth to the greatest threat for ethnic peace. The low wages and pensions, especially compared to the EU average, strengthen even further the iron grip of populists and ethnic entrepreneurs. The radicalization of nationalist rhetoric and the policies influenced by it deepen the sclerosis of political system, clogging the channels of political participation—which is a ramification of, for example, the attempt to limit the social benefits for minorities. The result is that new, fervent outbreaks of interethnic tension emerge constantly.
This book has the following objectives: to verify the hypotheses and to promote a better understanding of the essence of the Bulgarian ethnic model, its mechanism, its building blocks, and its advantages and vulnerabilities. In order to achieve these objectives, I have used the following methods: legal and political analysis of laws and regulations, a secondary analysis of statistical information, party programs, slogans, political messages, etc. The project reveals the way the institutions function and interact in resolving or instigating ethnic conflicts. It provides an assessment of the performance of these institutions and helps to map the dynamics and outline the possible stages in the development of the Bulgarian ethnic model. On the basis of the findings I make recommendations and formulate future scenarios for the development of political institutions and ethnic relations.
1. An Institutional Approach to Ethnic Conflicts
1.1 The debate—institutionalists and their opponents
The contemporary violent conflicts have numerous idiosyncrasies, which distinguish them from their predecessors. Today they are more often based on cultural differences; most of the time, unlike their predominantly interstate character in the past, their fires are burning within the borders of political communities (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 5); they are marked with ferocity, which leads to a drastic increase in the number of victims of the civilian population.27 The interethnic conflicts occur more often in or between the states that once belonged to the Communist bloc (on the territories of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans)28 in comparison to the Western liberal polities,29 but also in juxtaposition to other states with predominantly Muslim population, as well as to other less developed but well-consolidated democracies. Nowadays, more than ever, it is imperative to identify the causes of ethnic conflicts, which often predetermine the fate of entire nations. The institutional approach to these issues is part of the toolbox of a plethora of different theories. In this work, I refer to concepts coined and supported by leading institutionalists (e.g., Crawford and Lipschutz 1998). It would not be possible to represent and submit to a critical analysis the institutional approach to the study of conflicts in its entirety. The answers, which this approach provides, might be best understood in the context of the debate with rival interpretations.
According to the primordialists30 (Geertz 1973, Van Den Berghe 1978, Vanhanen 1991, Grosby 1994), “the centuries of accumulated hatred” between ethnic groups are rooted within the very essence of humans (Grosby 1994: 168). Ethnocentrism and racism are forms of nepotism, which assumed monstrous proportions. They have a tendency to favor the blood relatives at the expense of the others, because altruism and cooperation are genetically programmed to be triggered by the biological code of the common origin.31 The moment the grip of government is weakened, people start to look for and find a mainstay in life in national identity or in what passes as such. Primordialism, however, fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why some ethnic groups manage to live together in a relative peace (e.g., Bulgarians and Turks after 1989, French and Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, and Muslim Malays and Chinese Christians in Malaysia). The main disadvantage of primordialism is that it ignores the fact that differences in cultural identity do not necessarily lead to conflict. For this reason, at the center of the institutional approach lies the understanding that the conflict potential of the cultural, in particular, ethnic identity is unlocked only when it is politicized, that is when it becomes a criterion for discrimination and privileges in the struggle for the distribution of political and economic resources (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 11). Primordialists do not recognize the role of state institutions in the management of conflicts: in fact, the government can appease the latter (e.g., it can channel groups’ interests by means of legislative changes), legitimize, instigate, or even create and cultivate them.
The security dilemma approach (Butterfield 1951, Herz 1959, Jervis 1976) sometimes referred to also as “the spiral model,” developed by John Herz in his monograph Political Realism and Political Idealism (1951), offers an alternative explanation. Unlike primordialism, this approach accepts the importance of state institutions. When these institutions de facto cease to exist and anarchy prevails, security becomes a priority. Ironically, the measures that a group takes in this situation to ensure its safety (e.g., the development of new weapons and/or the modernization of the available arsenal and its expansion) provoke the fears of others. They now take similar actions, which are perceived as a threat by the first party. The result is, often, an arms race and a conflict escalation. In Herz’s own words, the security dilemma is a structural notion in which “the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening” (Herz 1950: 157). The security dilemma describes the mechanism of this vicious circle, which leads to a higher risk of using violence. The problem with this approach, according to institutionalists, is that, in the first place, it was developed originally for the needs of the theory of international relations and (tacitly and erroneously) puts on the same footing the interactions between countries with those between groups (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 12). In the second place, it accepts not unlike the primordialists that groups have a priori incompatible political interests and therefore the only question is under what conditions their clash will become of violent nature. Third, the security dilemma approach naively paints and supports a one-dimensional image of the role of institutions as a “good shepherd,” while their functions are much more complex. The institutions are guided by the “logic of the political game” (Levy et al. 1995) and, even if one of their tasks is to channel conflicts, they do not treat all conflicts equally. Institutions not only impose restrictions on the political actors, but can also provide incentives in order to influence political preferences. They could further prohibit discrimination and, instead, emphasize on competition between classes and ideologies or they could politicize ethnic identity. Fourth, Herz’s approach does not explain why interethnic strife and violence sometimes rage in political systems with strong and, in general, legitimate institutions neither it outlines the reasons for the failure or the demise of the latter.
The approach of liberal democracy and free market (Fukuyama 1992, Bhalla 1994, Whitehead 1995) affirms that they contribute to the aggregation and representation of all interests in society, by replacing conflicts based on ethnic identity with these, which stem from (economic) interests. The logic of this approach is that democratic polities and institutions are steered by individual rights rather than those of social collectivities. It is the individuals who are protected by the law and have the right of political participation. Wherever there are religious or ethnic conflicts, they can be successfully regulated and/or resolved, if the organizational principles of the political system recognize the necessity of tolerance and social cohesion. The theorists of consociational democracy32 (McGarry and O’Leary 1993, Lijphart 1968, 1977, 1994, 1999) and federalism (Stain 1968) support this view. Although this approach, which sees liberal democracy as a panacea for ethnic conflicts, is in its nature institutional, it is not unconditionally accepted even among the institutionalists.33 One well-known theory, which embraces this approach, is Francis Fukuyama’s concept of the “end of history” which was first formulated in an article for National Interest published in 1989.
Inspired by the “velvet revolutions” in Central and Eastern Europe, Fukuyama proclaims the triumph of liberal democracy. As an unlikely last stop in the “ideological evolution of mankind” and “last form of government,” it marks the “end of history” because it cultivates optimal conditions for the realization of human “desire for recognition,”34 scientific progress, and economic prosperity (Fukuyama 1992: xvii). It was, in a sense, “the VCRs [videocassette recorders] which actually won the Cold War” and led to the collapse of the communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain (Fukuyama 1992: xi, 98–108). One of the main arguments for the superiority of liberal democracy, according to the American political scientist, is that it forces the retreat of irrational forms of the desire for recognition such as nationalism; it soothes societies divided by ethnic cleavages and promotes consensus. The neoconservative project of Fukuyama was, however, met with considerable and, often, fierce criticisms. The “homogenizing,” “integrating,” and “pacifying” potential of the institutions of the liberal democracy is seen as particularly controversial. In response to Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington postulated the concept of the “clash of civilizations”35 (Huntington 2011), while immediately after the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the American journalist Fareed Zakaria sarcastically declared “the end of the end of history.”
Following the Hegelian Alexandre Kojève,36 Fukuyama perceives the existence of the EU as compelling evidence that liberal democracies can overcome national, ethnic, or cultural differences, and build a working supranational political system. The Bulgarian case after 1989 seems to be particularly relevant for the viability of Fukuyama’s project. The country, which is an EU member, is often held up as an example of a stable multiethnic polity. The peaceful coexistence in close proximity in the center of the capital Sofia of four religious institutions (the Orthodox Church “St. Nedelya,” the Catholic cathedral “St. Joseph,” the mosque “Banya Bashi,” and the Sofia Synagogue) is even referred to as “a cliche of multiculturalism” (Detrez and Segaert 2008: 55). Notwithstanding, European leaders such as Chancellor Angela Merkel, Prime Minister David Cameron, and President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the fiasco of the policies and ideas of multiculturalism, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban defended the need to build an “illiberal state,” because liberalism is the god that failed (Traub 2015). Furthermore, the events in front of the same mosque “Banya Bashi” in 2011 unequivocally indicate that the interethnic tensions in Bulgaria are on the rise. I claim that the main thesis of Fukuyama cannot be supported because of its historicism and holistic zeal (in the sense of Karl Popper37). The institutions of liberal democracy in many cases are an effective means to control and overcome the tensions between ethnic groups. However, the economic inequalities caused by the policy of accelerated liberalization and the long-term effects of globalization can easily turn against the liberal political practices, undermining their foundations, while fanning and feeding the flames of ethnic conflict. This conclusion is supported by the analysis of the current Bulgarian ethnic model. In fact, Fukuyama himself, as we shall see, revised and reevaluated in his later writings the positions advocated in The End of History (Fukuyama 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2012, 2013).
Regardless of the many aspects of the institutional approach, we can outline several major points on which its proponents maintain relative consensus. They correspond to the questions raised in the debate with rival theories. First, as already mentioned, not the ethnic identity itself, but its politicization creates preconditions for conflict. Politicization traditionally became the path of colonization (as was, for example, in the Ottoman Empire through the institution of millet,38 or in India, as part of the British Empire) or it was engineered within political systems by their elites (e.g., in the United States such a role had the segregation laws known as “Jim Crow,” while in Russia similar function had the temporary regulations regarding Jews—also known as the “May” anti-Semitic laws, introduced by Emperor Alexander III, in 1882–1914). The political importance of cultural cleavages will be strengthened or even “invented”—artificially created where existing “faults” in society are legitimated by state institutions. In particular, economic discrimination and preferential status based on ascribed (ethnic, religious, etc.) signs make cultural identity politically significant (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 26). Conversely, second, the political relevance of identity may be reduced if it is sanctioned by those in power (ibid.: 18). The stronger and more legitimate the institutions, the greater their chances to weaken the political significance of differences or to transform the volatile tensions between groups into nonviolent competition (we observe this situation in Adjara, an autonomous republic within Georgia; Malaysia, where political parties operate on the basis of ethnicity; another example is South Africa after the abolition of apartheid).
Third, if the institutions are illegitimate in the eyes of groups deprived of access to resources, but still can, nonetheless, effectively exercise coercion, the discontent will be kept under control (e.g., the Georgians in Abkhazia, or South Africa before 1990). It follows that, fourth, when the repressive institutions are weakened or they collapse we can expect the eruption of interethnic strife (such as the violent conflicts that accompanied or followed the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia—in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, etc.). The collapse of institutions could be the result of the influence of internal or external factors, such as, in particular, the short-sighted economic policies or the negative effects of globalization.39 Fifth, ethnic entrepreneurs will be facilitated in their actions and have more chances to mobilize support for their “programs” when the ethnic card was previously used by the eroded or nonexisting state apparatus; when minorities are, comparably, more affected than the rest of population by unfavorable economic conditions or liberalization; and when these “entrepreneurs” can offer political resources to the affected by the crisis40 (e.g., Vladislav Ardzinba in Abkhazia, Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, and Franjo Tuđman in Croatia).
These guiding points in the interpretation of conflicts can be illustrated and confirmed by comparing the political institutions of Republic of South Africa (RSA) before and after 1991, when the system of racial segregation, the apartheid,41 was abolished and denounced by the South African politicians. Racial segregation in South Africa already existed during the period of the Dutch and British colonial rule. Its foundations were laid in the seventeenth century. Apartheid became official state policy after the elections in 1948. It was conducted through several laws passed by the National Party, which were headed by Protestant priest Daniel François Malan (1874–1959). Legislation classified inhabitants into four racial groups—“black,” “white,” “colored,” and “Indian.” The last two groups were divided into several subclassifications.42 On the basis of this “distinction,” the residential areas were segregated.43 Apart from the white the other racial groups were not represented politically. The “black people” were deprived of citizenship. The government segregated public transport, hospitals, schools, universities, etc. The marriages and sexual contacts between the races were prohibited. The apartheid was the subject of fierce resistance of the oppressed ethnic groups and placed South Africa in international isolation, but because of the effective power of the repressive state institutions, it was maintained for decades.
The analyses and evaluations of the contemporary political system of South Africa, after the abolition of apartheid, are contradictory. Thanks to the country’s liberal constitution and, in particular, the positive role of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, initiated by President Nelson Mandela, the re-politicization of ethnic identity has so far been avoided. The role of ethnic cleavages as main generator of conflicts has been replaced, however, by fierce class polarization.44 Although the RSA has been ranked fifth in Africa in terms of income per capita, nearly one-quarter of the population of 58.9 million is unemployed. The country, which has 11 official languages, is marked by growing xenophobia and violence against immigrants (Crush and Pendleton 2004). The political repressions have been resumed under the rule of the current president of South Africa and leader of the African National Congress—Jacob Zuma (Buccus 2011). These facts raise concerns for the future.
If the example of the apartheid in South Africa seems too distant or “exotic” compared to the situation in Bulgaria, one has to take a look at the Roma ghettoes and de facto segregated schools that continue to exist in the small Balkan state.45 The following section, which examines the reasons for the painful decay and violent decomposition of Yugoslavia, provides a further, more detailed illustration of the institutionalists’ approach to ethnic conflicts. The ethnic relations in this former neighbor of our country bare some striking similarities to the ethnic models operating in Bulgaria. I use the insights of the study of SFRY as a fundament of the analysis of the Bulgarian case.
1.2 A historical “autopsy”—explaining the demise of SFRY
The literature that embarks on the Sisyphean task to rationalize the violent dissolution of the Yugoslav federation46 is voluminous. There are several rival camps offering competing theories. The essentialist or primordial perspective stresses the importance of the “Balkan temperament” and the “ancient hatreds” which were unleashed by the collapse of the communist regime (Silber and Little 1991, Vodopivec 1992, Kaplan 1993, Mearsheimer and Pape 1993, Gligorov 1995). An alternative school of thought points at the international forces as the central causes (Cvii 1993, Higgins 1993, Nuttal 1994, Pavlowitch 1994, Rief 1994).47 Some scholars see the culprit in the processes of economic liberalization and global integration, which in their view undermined the institutions of the Yugoslav federal state (Woodward 1995). On their turn, the instrumentalists emphasize the role of political entrepreneurs such as Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman who exploited the ethnic cleavages and instigated ethnic hatred in order to mobilize supporters in their quest for power (Bookman 1994, Denitch 1994, Bose 1995, Zimmerman 1995). There are numerous objections to all of these approaches that cast a serious shadow on their heuristic value.48 I shall not discuss them further. Instead I shall examine the institutionalist analysis in Crawford and Lipschutz’s The Myth of Ethnic Conflict,49 which in my opinion offers a deeper insight.
Institutionalists highlight the very nature of the principle of ethnofederalism, around which Yugoslavia’s political system was built (which bears similarities to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union). Ethnofederalism, in general, is characterized by structures of accountability and opportunities for resource control that prompt officials at both central (federal) and local levels to privilege specific ethnic constituencies. As the federal system of Yugoslavia weakened and the local officials relied more and more on the support of their ethnic constituencies rather than the central government, the logic of identity politics strengthened. The creation of ethnic nationalist parties and the interethnic political rivalry was rooted in the institutional legacies. The effects of bandwagoning in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, on the eve of the violent ethnic conflicts, drastically reduced the chances of nonnationalist alternative parties (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 205–7).
The analysis must also take into account the traumatic heritage of the Second World War during which Croatian and Bosnian Muslim elites allied with the Nazis against the Serbs.50 President Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) believed that the federal polity, established as a system of six ethnic republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), and enshrined in the Constitution of the SFRY promulgated on January 31, 1946, would provide better guarantees for the national equality than the previous unitary state51 (Christman 1970: 56). However, unlike the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and, especially, the Soviet Union, the federal system in Yugoslavia was noncentralized52 and the constituent units exercised a large degree of authority. The 1946 Constitution stipulated that all mineral wealth, power resources, means of communication, and foreign trade are under the control of the federal government. However, the latter could take decisions on a very limited number of issues without the approval of the constituent units (Koštunica 1988: 78–92).
La raison d'être of the institutions of ethnofederalism was to transform the politically charged ethnic identities into much safer cultural identities. The Constitution essentially differentiated between two types of national groupings that were in hierarchical relations (Peši 1996: 10). On the one hand, Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians, and Montenegrins were territorially organized in republics in which they had the position of “constituent nations.” The census conducted in 1971 recognized Muslims as a separate nation and in 1974 it was declared (following the national principle) that Serbs, Croats, and Muslims are the constituent nations of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, there was, however, a significant number of “others” (Jews, Czechs, Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians, Romani, Vlachs, Albanians, and Hungarians) who were less represented in the political institutions. Nonetheless, after the legislative amendments in 1974, Kosovo (with a majority of Albanian population) and Vojvodina (with a Hungarian majority) gained increasing autonomy and enjoyed equal representation at the federal level with the six constituent nations.
The principle of federalism was implemented in two distinct ways (or at two different levels). The Federal Assembly consisted of a Federal Council (for which citizens voted as Yugoslavs) and a Chamber of Nationalities (in which citizens were represented as nations and nationalities). The objective of this system was to achieve a balance between the interests of all peoples of Yugoslavia. Tito realized that if even one of the constituent nations was favored by the masters of the political game, the hegemon could jeopardize the whole system.53 The constituent nations, in principle, had equal say. Since they were far from being homogenous,54 the territorial ethnofederalism was cemented with ethnic quotas for the allocation of resources. The appointments to public office followed “a formula for the proportional representation, or sometimes of the equal representation,” of individuals by constituent nation/nationality (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 210). The reforms created socioeconomic divisions that transcended ethnic cleavages and were potentially cross-cutting. This essentially meant that the various ethnic groups who belonged to the same socioeconomic class had more in common with each other than with their ethnic compatriots; thus ideological consensus and division could potentially overcome regional and cultural differences (ibid.: 216).
The integration policies initially relied on Marxist ideology and oppression. The public debates on ethnic issues were stifled and prosecuted.55 The demands of the ethnic groups had to be voiced in economic and social terms in order to be accepted as legitimate by the institutions.56 Although these restrictive measures were largely abandoned in the 1960s, the expression of nationalism continued to be illegal as was, for example, the incitement to discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, and ethnicity. Two political institutions—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav National Army—as well as the allocative policies that privileged partisans from all national groups who fought against fascism had important roles in the integration processes. These helped to build new types of solidarity (mainly on the grounds of the Marxist ideology which corroborated the belief that one day all ethnic groups will become a single Yugoslav nation) and were, to a certain extent, successful in their attempt to mitigate the painful ethnic cleavages. In fact, there was an abundance of evidence, which suggested that the economic cleavages, mainly between the urban and rural population,57 were more important than the ethnic ones. In addition to that, the regional divisions became even deeply rooted than socioeconomic and ideological cleavages (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 220–2).
The entities in the Yugoslav federation were not equally developed economically. The two main objectives of the economic planners were to maintain a high rate of growth in conjunction with a reduction of the intraregional economic disparities. For these reasons, each five-year plan demanded the equalization of conditions in the regions. As a result of these policies, the republics fought bitterly over their share of the investment funds distributed by the federal government. Slovenia and Croatia were the richest and the most efficient and they demanded that resources be allocated by efficiency criteria. Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro were poorer. They fought for funds as development subsidies, because all funds were administered from a central General Investment Fund and the industrial development was regulated by the central government:
Divisions among the republics over investment took the form of centre-region controversies. The poorer republics were dependent on the centre for development funds, and the richer republics wanted autonomy from the centre to free them from subsidies and regulation. In addition […] partisan elites pressed for regional credit allocations based on political criteria rewarding partisan loyalty and punishing those who had opposed the partisans in the war. (Ibid.: 218)
In a nutshell, the policies of central economic planning and distribution of resources created discontent among all entities of the federation.58 The policies had two important consequences: first, the disputes that they instigated fueled constitutional debates which in turn exacerbated the conflicts between the regions as the attempts for their resolution weakened the administrative center of Yugoslavia; second, they led to the development of regional and republican loyalties that were stronger than the loyalty to the federation (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 220–1). The entrenchment of ethnofederalism, which politicized cultural identity, consolidated the power of the local elites and thus made cultural divisions even deeper. The legislative changes in 1953, 1963 (when a new constitution was drafted), and 1967, which were designed to appease the rivalries between the republics and to combat the deepening economic problems, favored the decentralization as a solution. Ironically, the result was further economic decline. The central government grew weaker and the disintegration of the market “into eight mercantilist and protectionist regional fiefdoms” hindered efficiency and growth59 (Rusinow 1985: 140–2). The strengthening of the Chamber of Nationalities, “at the expense” of the federal chamber which was downgraded, bolstered ethnic and regional political power and embittered ethnic tensions. Because representation in the Chamber of Nationalities was based on the principles of equality and proportionality, each of the six republics, regardless of the size of their population, had 20 delegates. This meant, essentially, that Serbs, who had about 40% of the total population of the federation, had only 14% of the votes in the Chamber—the same as the Slovenes, who represented merely 8.5%. This formula of representation benefitted the smaller and richer republics in order to compensate them for the disproportional burden in the regional development policy that they bore. However, the policy backfired because it channeled resentments and privileges “away from territorially defined republics and directed them toward specific ethnic groups”; thus, “Serbs began to resent Croats, not just Croatia” (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 225).
The devolution reached a climax in the constitution adopted in 1974, which virtually transformed Yugoslavia into confederation. The authority retained by the center was further restricted and confined mainly to the fields of foreign policy, defense, and the protection of national rights.60 The principle of proportional representation in federal appointments was abandoned in favor of complete equality between the constituent entities61 regardless of the population size. In short, the smaller subjects of the federation were highly overrepresented, while the larger ones were acutely underrepresented. The legacy of ethnofederalism thus had three main consequences: the demise of the authority of the center which effectively put an end to the federal protection of the rights of minorities and provided incentives for the local politicians to exploit ethnic resentments; it prevented the formation of coalitions across ideological lines that could help to consolidate the dissolving federation; and it also blocked the possibility of coalitions across regional lines (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 238–39). The gates were opened wide for ethnic violence to enter the political scene.
1.3 The Bulgarian ethnic models
We can distinguish between four models of ethnic relations,62 consolidated through the legislation, which existed in Bulgaria after its liberation in 1878 from the Ottoman yoke.63 The chief mark of the government policies toward minorities until 1989 was their highly contradictory character. One of the invaluable lessons from the analysis of the collapse of the Yugoslav federation is that, in general, the conflict potential of ethnic identity can be unlocked and storm out of control when it becomes a criterion that determines access to (power) resources, i.e., when identity is politicized. Such politicization was present in all three models before 1989. The first of them, “the archetype,” operated until 1944. Although some scholars claim that it was designed “to ensure the rights and freedoms of all ethnic groups and confessions” (Aresnova and Kertikov 2002), the reality was different.
As it is apparent from Table 1, the two largest minorities in the country since 1878 have always been the Turks and the Roma. As a whole the minorities did not have their own, significant presence in the political process until 1944, perhaps, even until 1989. Indeed, in the Constituent Assembly (February 10, 1878–April 18, 1879)—the first Bulgarian Parliament after 1878, there were 16 representatives of ethnic/religious minorities (12 Turks, 2 Greeks, 1 Jew, and 1 Bulgarian Protestant), or 6.9% of all members of the Assembly (Todorov 2010: 270). Nonetheless, this in fact was a confirmation of “the unwritten rule” that minorities might participate in politics but only as members of Bulgarian parties (Nazurska 1999: 19–22). After the term of the Constituent Assembly ended, the situation changed. There were no more Jewish or Greek members of the parliament.
Table 1. Main ethnic groups in Bulgaria since 1878
| Year | Bulgarians | % | Turks | % | Roma | % |
| 2011* | 5,664,624 | 84.8 | 588,318 | 8.8 | 325,343 | 4.9 |
| 2001 | 6,655,210 | 83.9 | 746,664 | 9.4 | 370,908 | 4.7 |
| 1992 | 7,271,185 | 85.7 | 800,052 | 9.4 | 313,396 | 3.7 |
| 1975 | 7,930,024 | 90.9 | 730,728 | 8.4 | ** | ** |
| 1946 | 5,903,580 | 84.0 | 675,500 | 9.6 | 170,011 | 2.4 |
| 1926 | 4,557,706 | 83.2 | 577,552 | 10.5 | 138,844 | 2.5 |
| 1900 | 2,888,219 | 77.1 | 531,240 | 14.2 | 89,549 | 2.4 |
Source: Miris (2001) and NSI (2011).
Note: *The data for 2011 are from the population census conducted in 2011 (see NSI 2011). The problem with these data is that they are not calculated on the basis of 100% of the population (the figures only reflect those who responded to the question regarding their ethnicity; 683,590 did not respond to this question). Therefore, it is hard to make comparisons with previous years.
**The asterisks in the table signify “no available data.”
The (Bulgarian) parties preferred “to work” with the “more compact” minorities of Turks and Pomaks, who were cautious and reluctant to express demands; this “formula” was continuously implemented until 1944 (Todorov 2010: 270). The Roma were almost completely excluded from the political process. For the most part (until 1934) the attitude of the authorities toward the Turks was tolerant. However the latter remained isolated politically. One of the reasons for that was their low literacy—only 6% of them were literate in 1910, 14.5% in 1934; among the Pomaks64 the respective numbers were 3.8% in 1910 and 8.6% in 1934 (Daskalov 2005: 36–8). Until 1944, Bulgarian Turks retained their religious autonomy, including the related Sharia traditional judicial system. Following the defeat in the First World War, Bulgaria signed an agreement on minority rights (1919). After 1934, however, began the policies of assimilation in the Rhodope Mountains. As far as other, smaller minorities are concerned, the Jews and Armenians were well integrated, at least until the beginning of 1940s (Todorov 2010: 270), when as an ally of the Nazi Third Reich, the Bulgarian government passed anti-Semitic laws (the Law on Protection of the Nation, 1941; the Law for the One-Off Tax on Property of Persons of Jewish Origin, 1941). Only the timely intervention of the monarch himself, members of the parliament, the Bulgarian Patriarchate, and the society as a whole saved from deportation to the concentration camps 48,000 Bulgarian Jews (Makariev 1999: 240).
Three other ethnic models have been established after the Second World War. Two of them operated under the totalitarian regime (1949–1989). The first one (until 1956), the “Dimitrov–Chervenkov” model, was characterized by the protectionist policy of cultural emancipation of ethnic communities through specifically designed for their (social) benefits. The second model (1956–1989) brought an abrupt change in the direction of “ethnic homogenization”65 (Kalinova and Baeva 2001). Still, some of the government measures had positive character, such as the rise of educational status of minorities, the formation of (minority) elites through special quotas in party-state apparatus, creating jobs, providing housing for the Turks and the Roma,66 etc. In December 1984, the government abandoned the policy of peaceful integration and began to forcefully change the Turkish-Arab names of Turks to Bulgarian (the official term used for this policy was “Revival Process” or “Process of Rebirth”). The process was not dissimilar to some of the previous policies of other Balkan countries toward their own minorities during the twentieth century, including the SFRY.
The third, currently operating in Bulgaria ethnic model, has been established after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. This model provides much more significant means and possibilities for the protection of rights and the expression of the interests of the minorities, especially in comparison to its “predecessors” which operated in the conditions of ideological monism and one-party dominance. The model is supported, although not without problems, by the Constitution (1991), the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities ratified by the BNA (1995), the Act on Confessions (2002), the Protection against Discrimination Act (PADA, 2003), as well as, in general, the policies of the executive. At the heart of the model is the institutionalization of the ethnic cleavage. This has been achieved mainly through the party of the ethnic minorities—the MRF, founded in 1990—which has been represented in all Bulgarian parliaments after the democratic changes. The political support for the party comes predominantly from Bulgarian Turks (almost 90% of the electorate) followed by Roma and Pomaks.67 The movement has a prominent role in the postcommunist political system and has taken part in three governments. The party is also well represented at municipal level.68
There are several reasons why the politicization of ethnic identity during the totalitarian regime did not escalate to armed conflict or brought the collapse of government. First and foremost, unlike the entities of SFRY, the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria never enjoyed a territorial autonomy and thus avoided the potentially tormenting relationship with the administrative center which comes “bundled” with it, nor they had the history of independent (ethnically based) polities. Second, as opposed to the dying moments of SFRY, the Bulgarian totalitarian machine was, even during the final years of its existence and operation, powerful enough to suppress and keep within safe limits the fire of interethnic tensions, as well as to impose its public policies. Third, in general, the tolerant, political culture of the dominant ethnic group (Bulgarians) was a natural barrier to the political perversions and excesses of government. The Revival Process contributed to the delegitimization of the regime. Although the process embittered and deepened the ethnic cleavage, the actions of the establishment, who inspired the repressions, were not condoned by the majority of Bulgarians. Fourth, the very nature of the Orthodox Church (free of religious zeal or militantism) contributes to the relatively tolerant political culture of Bulgarian people. In general, the orthodox Christianity is characterized by deeply rooted passivity and contemplation. Perhaps these traits were further strengthened by mediaeval Hesychasm, which occupies an important place in Orthodox culture and spirituality. At the same time, the Islam which Bulgarian Turks profess has never been radical. Fifth, not without significance is the fact that a substantial part of the elite of the ethnic groups in this period was “created” and/or “recruited” by the state. Thus the ethnic tensions could be kept “under the hood.”
The question of mechanisms of politicization of ethnic identity is not sufficiently developed in the study edited by Crawford and Lipschutz (1998). In my view, depending on the subjects and objects of politicization, its intentional or rather inadvertent (unpremeditated) character, we can distinguish between several mechanisms serving this purpose. The first of them, as demonstrated above, is actually transforming ethnic identity “into an entry ticket” used to obtain political rights and economic resources. The subject of this politicization is the dominant ethnic group through the means of state institutions, including the repressive apparatus, which are controlled by it, while the objects are the subordinate ethnicities (examples from Bulgaria are the infamous attempts to assimilate Bulgarian Muslims in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1970s, as well as the Revival Process, 1984–1989). Second, the political mobilization, which tries to manipulate identity, can be directed to members of the own ethnic group. The mechanism often operates on the basis of invoked “existential” and “inevitable” “dilemma”—“it is either we or them.” In this fashion, “work” the slogans of Bulgarian PRR parties Ataka and National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), which call for immediate action against the threat of “Osmanization” and “Turkish assimilation” of Bulgaria.69 The principal goal of this mechanism is to “awaken” or “activate” the ethnic group to which the political messages are targeted, by making it “aware” of its identity. Such messages, which are based on striking fears (of assimilation or even extermination—ethnocide, etc.), can also be directed toward the members of the ethnicity by its leaders. Ethnic minorities themselves (or their individual representatives) may decide or be forced by circumstances to politicize their identity in order to increase and optimize, if we use Ralf Dahrendorf’s dictum, their “life chances” (Dahrendorf 2007). The process can be aimed at inclusion into the dominant ethnic group (as was the objective of many of the founders of the organization “Rodina,” operating in the Rhodope Mountains during 1937–1947, who were in fact Bulgarian Muslims); or it can be led by duty to return to the “true fatherland” (as was during the emigration of thousands of Bulgarian Muslims to Turkey); it can further be an expression of political mobilization for the protection of the minority (e.g., the MRF rejects the claims that it is an ethnic party; in the same vein were the political messages and activities of Kamen Burov—the mayor of a village of Jyltusha, located in the eastern Rhodope Mountains, and the Democratic Labour Party,70 which he established in 1992). Third, the subject of politicization can be organizations, which are external to the country, while its objects are ethnicities that live in it. In this category belong the actions of Islamic missionaries among Bulgarian Muslims.
Fourth, the mechanism of, what I shall call, “involuntary politicization” must be studied separately. The measures of positive discrimination of state institutions to vulnerable ethnic groups, and the actions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in defense of these ethnicities often further enhance the negative stereotypes in the dominant ethnic group toward minorities. Thus, ironically, these measures politicize ethnic identity. For example, the need for desegregation in education and housing, which has been one of the chief causes of Bulgarian and foreign, international human rights organizations71 and activists promoting the rights of Roma, in general, is met by the cold shoulder of the dominant ethnicity, and (probably) further mobilizes public opinion against political minorities. Seventy-one percent of other ethnic groups believe that the segregated Roma neighborhoods (ghettos) should remain, while 57.6% of respondents reckon that “it will be better if Roma children do not attend the same school as Bulgarians” (Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007: 131–2). This taxonomy of mechanisms of politicization of ethnicity is by no means exhaustive. Different versions of these mechanisms operate in political practice and, almost always, work simultaneously.
1.4 Contemporary challenges to ethnic relations
The first challenge is the demographic crisis. The population growth in Bulgaria is negative (−0.83% for 2014) and is the fifth lowest in the world. Only Syria, Cook Islands, Moldova, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon have lower population growth (CIA 2014). The death rate for 2014 is 14.3, the sixth highest in the world (ibid.). In 1990–2005 between 937,000 and 1,200,000 left Bulgaria due to the acute economic crisis.72 According to the 2011 census, the population of Bulgaria is 7,364,570 people. Bulgarians are the largest ethnic group and comprise 84.8% of the population. Turkish and Roma minorities comprise 8.8% and 4.9%, respectively73; some 40 smaller minorities comprise 0.7%, and 0.8% do not self-identify with an ethnic group (NSI 2011). However these data should be taken with a grain of salt because they are not calculated on the basis of 100% of the population. According to the CIA World Factbook for 2014, the population of Bulgaria is actually significantly smaller or 6,924,716 people (July 2014 estimate).74 The demographic crisis, combined with the fact that the Roma are subject to a number of measures of positive discrimination, while distinguished by criminal activity that exceeds many times that of the other groups, fuels the extremely negative ethnic stereotypes toward this ethnic group (Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007).
Therefore, a second challenge, intertwined with that outlined above, is the raise of discrimination on ethnic grounds, particularly against Roma (see Figure 1). According to a representative survey conducted in 2011 as part of the project “EU INCLUSIVE—data transfer and exchange of best practices between Romania, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy relating to the inclusion of the Roma population,” nearly 46% of Roma believe that nowadays discrimination against their community has increased significantly in the last 10 years (see Figure 1). The share of those who report no change is 24% (Petkova 2013). Research conducted by the “Open Society” Institute, which analyzed the Roma Inclusion (Metodieva et al. 2012) demonstrated that, in fact, a relatively small part of the members of this ethnic community live on state benefits. The data are contrary to the popular opinion that Roma do not work because they live on the money for child allowances. Only 4.3% of the representatives of this ethnic minority receive maternity benefits and child allowances for children up to one year, and 9.6% receive support for socially disadvantaged (see Table 2).
Figure 1. Discrimination against Roma
Source: Petkova (2013).
Today, compared to 10 years ago, the Roma are:
Table 2. Main sources of income for Roma households
Source: Metodieva et al. (2012: 46).
| Wages or salaries | 32.3% |
| Income from casual work | 18.2% |
| Pension based on working experience and/or age | 10.6% |
| Pension for disability or sickness | 9.1% |
| Child allowance, for children up to the age of 18, if in school | 6.0% |
| Monthly allowance for poor households | 4.5% |
| Money transfers from people working abroad | 3.7% |
| Profit from own business | 3.1% |
| Monthly allowance for pregnancy, birth, child up to one year | 2.8% |
| Unemployment benefits | 2.5% |
| Monthly allowance for raising a child up to one year | 1.5% |
| Social pension for old age | 0.6% |
| Other social benefits | 1.5% |
| Other pension | 1.4% |
| Other income | 2.3% |
Third, various studies, based on the famous scale of Emory S. Bogardus, demonstrate the increase of social, interethnic distances that are an indicator of tolerance of a given society (Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007, Pamporov 2008, Pamporov 2016). As far as the two most significant minorities are concerned, these distances remain the largest vis-à-vis the Roma. Usually the respondents who “agree” that Turks should live in Bulgaria are in the range of 80–89%, regarding Pomaks—81–87%, and Roma—in the range of 66–76%. In 2007, 56.1% of Bulgarians “agreed” with Pomaks living in the country, while, regarding the Turks and the Roma, these figures were respectively 54.7% and 44.4% (Pamporov 2008: 107). It appears that the “new minorities”—Arabs, Vietnamese, and Chinese, who are often “invisible” to the state administration and the media—“are much more rejected by the Bulgarians and the population of the country as a whole” (ibid.: 109). As far as the other Balkan peoples are concerned, the social distances are largest in regard to Albanians. Other scholars provide more optimistic data (e.g., Nedelcheva 2011). While some distances indeed are increasing (there is, e.g., a greater confinement in the personal space, which makes it even more difficult to accept persons who have a different ethnicity), others are diminishing (Nedelcheva 2011). In 2009, for example, 37.8% of Bulgarians believe that the Turks are a threat to national security of Bulgaria, while in 1992 this percent was higher—51.1%. The share of Bulgarians and Turks, who perceive Roma as criminals, is decreasing (ibid.: 88–9). In 2009, in comparison to 1992, a smaller percentage of Turks (66.9% vs. 42.4%) and Roma (68.6% vs. 61.4%) believe that Bulgarians are a privileged ethnic group. There are signs, according to Nedelcheva, of an on-going crisis and destruction of national identity, but I think that this does not necessarily mean that Bulgarians “embrace European values” or that “their biographies are globalizing,” as this scholar claims (Nedelcheva 2011: 90–6).
A study of “Gallup International”—At the End of the Decade of Roma Inclusion: Symptoms of Permanent Exclusion, which was conducted between June 26–July 2, 2015—confirms that the social distances between Roma and the other large ethnic groups are increasing (Gallup 2015)75 in spite of state’s integration policies. Attitudes toward Roma do not differ significantly in between social groups. In fact, people “who are in a favorable life situation” are even more alienated against this ethnicity. In the public eye, politicians are to blame “for problems” with Roma communities (Gallup 2015). The survey was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the ethnic tension in Garmen and Orlandovtsi, which might have had an impact on results; however, according to the analysis, the data are unlikely to be significantly different “in a more relaxed atmosphere” (ibid.). In general, the attitude toward Roma is not noticeably affected by the level of education. For example, university graduates are no more tolerant than those with secondary education. A specific case is the group of respondents with primary or lower education where the negative attitudes also prevail, but not to the extent mentioned above. The reason is that many Roma fall in this educational group. Negative attitudes seem even more significant in the larger settlements where the Roma communities are isolated in ghettoes and slums. The latter create “a sense of privilege before the law,” which is an additional factor for the negative attitudes. More negative attitudes toward Roma are expressed in the private sphere/family life. For example, only 9% answered positively to the question whether they would marry Roma, while 85% gave a negative answer. Only 4% of ethnic Bulgarians and 6% of Turks state that they would marry a representative of the Roma minority (ibid.). In Part 2,76 I explore the way in which the increasing social distances affect the perspectives in front of the populist radical parties in Bulgaria.
Fourth, the radical antiestablishment attitudes and nationalism are further amplified by the repercussions of the civil war in Syria. Since 2013 we have witnessed an unprecedented growth of refugees who seek asylum in Bulgaria. In October 2013, the vast majority of Bulgarians (83%) expressed concern that the Syria refugee crisis is coupled with hidden security risks (Alpha Research 2013). Around this position is consolidated a majority encompassing all sociodemographic groups. Only 17% see no serious reason for concern (ibid.). A study published in January 2014, however, shows that the public is calming down regarding the refugee crisis (Gallup 2014a). Fifty-two percent believe that Bulgaria should help Syrian refugees; 28% think that the country should not accept them and expel those who have already entered. Strikingly, the PRR party Ataka, on the one hand, and political formations, which claim that they are representatives of Roma like DROM (Movement for an Equal Public Model), on the other, share a similar, negative stand toward the refugees. The refugee wave, which has been widely covered by the media, has been used by a number of political formations (e.g., by IMRO and the newly formed Nationalist Party of Bulgaria) in their xenophobic propaganda. The fears that a new, bigger “refugee wave” might sweep over Bulgaria are likely to draw even more water into the “mills” of ethnic entrepreneurs.
The fifth challenge is a complex one. The national security of any polity that is guided by the principle of popular sovereignty is dependent on the homeostasis of democratic political system. In theory, the differentia specifica of this system is shaped by three interlinked components. The first is the existence of active civil society, which by definition must be unrestricted by state interference (the latter could often be masked under the role of “benevolent” stewardship). The second is the presence of effective political intermediary institutions—political parties, movements, interest groups, media, etc. The main task of the intermediaries is to aggregate and express the interests arising in the civil society, which then receive the chance to be presented at the level of parliament, and central and local government. The third component consists of the institutions of the state, which are to be guided by the fundamental constitutional principles of liberal democracy (separation of powers, rule of law, popular sovereignty, freedom of speech, etc.). These interrelated components define the character of a democratic political system and are not only its greatest strength but also its paramount weakness. If only one of them deviates of its purpose or loses its legitimacy due to political malignancies like corruption and nepotism, the whole delicate mechanism becomes in danger. For example, the obstruction of the channels of political participation entails the sclerosis of the democratic political system. The symptoms for the latter are, for instance, the raise of political tensions, the increase of pressure from protests, and acts of civil disobedience.
The analysis reveals problems in all three components outlined above. These issues reflect on ethnic tensions and conflicts, crippling the possibilities for their peaceful transformation. The defects in the modus operandi of Bulgarian political system, most of which could be traced back to the dark history of the Bulgarian transition to a market economy and democracy, pose the most significant challenge to the ethnic model. As far as civil society is concerned, it should be pointed out that despite the active involvement of various NGOs that chivalrously take up the cause of ethnic minorities they are often not recognized as legitimate representatives of their interests. The capacity of these organizations to influence state institutions and polices remains very limited, while their weak contacts and representation at European level contribute further to their marginalization. The media, which should serve as a compass to civil society, continue to suffer from severe censorship in Bulgaria. The country was ranked 109 in the 2017 World Press Freedom Index.77 The Press in Bulgaria is the least free of all EU countries (Reporters Without Borders 2017).78 The significance of the other components (the party and the judicial system, as well as the integration policies of the Bulgarian state) for the ethnic relations will be analyzed in the following sections of this work. Here I would only make two important conclusions from the analysis of the SFRY which are directly related to the state of the components.
Although Bulgaria is a unitary state under the Constitution of 1991, the contemporary model of ethnic relations which was established in the 1990s bears similarities to some of the characteristic features of the ethnofederalism in the wretched Yugoslavia. Both political systems utilize the institutionalization of the ethnic cleavages as a safe valve through which the tensions between the ethnic groups could be peacefully channelized and defused. However, institutionalization, as we already established, is not without significant drawbacks. First, it politicizes ethnic identity and thus, ironically, vindicates the actions of ethnic entrepreneurs. The mere existence of the parties of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, such as MRF, has become a justification for the existence of political formations such as Ataka and NFSB.79 The support for these parties, as well as the “nationalist” vote, in general, is boosted further by the allegations of corruption against some of the leaders and functionaries of the MRF. The latter suffers from opaque decision-making procedures and limited intraparty democracy (Karasimeonov 2010, Cholakov 2014b).80 It has to be emphasized that these negative traits are not limited to the MRF. Many of the political parties in the country are marked by them, although to a different extent.81 There are also the ominous signs of, if we use the well-known concept of Peter Mair, the cartelization of the political system (Katz and Mair 1995, Mair 1998). This leads to the second issue. As the analysis of SFRY has demonstrated, the politicized ethnicity, in itself, could become dangerous only when the institutions that are meant to channelize the ethnic conflicts are eroded and their legitimacy disputed. Unlike the federal institutions of Yugoslavia that initially were strong but were undermined by decentralization and devolution, the postcommunist political institutions in Bulgaria remain weak, underdeveloped, and fragile. They are plagued by sluggish bureaucratic procedures. The justice system,82 including the defense of the right of the minorities, is inefficient and prone to political influences (Cholakov 2014a).83
1.5 Strength of state institutions and ethnic conflicts
There is another problem in the paradigm of conflict analysis proposed by Beverly Crawford and her colleagues84 in The Myth of Ethnic Conflict, which is more imperious than the explanation of the precise mechanisms of politicization. As mentioned, that study postulates that the strength of state institutions in the management and control over ethnic conflicts can offset their illegitimacy. The term “strength of institutions” requires further examination. Following the classic definition of Max Weber, political scientists and sociologists often understand state as a “human community which exercises monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force [violence] within a certain territory” (Weber 2003: 310–11). The essence of “stateness,” according to this approach, is the enforcement (Fukuyama 2004a: 21). However, as Fukuyama points out, it is necessary to distinguish between the “strength” of state institutions and the “scope” of state functions (ibid.: 21–2). This distinction, which will help to better understand how a state deals with interethnic tensions, is lacking in the classic analyses in The Myth of Ethnic Conflict. The “strength” or the “capacity”85 of institutions is a testament to their quality and describes the ability:
to enact statutes and to frame and execute policies; to administer the public business with relative efficiency; to control graft, corruption, and bribery; to maintain high levels of transparency and accountability in governmental institutions; and most importantly, to enforce laws. (Fukuyama 2004a: 22)
There is no commonly accepted mechanism to measure institutional capacity. Furthermore, the process of making comparisons between political systems is greatly complicated by the fact that the performance of state’s agencies can fluctuate significantly. A given country can simultaneously have, for example, efficient repressive apparatus and extremely cumbersome bureaucratic procedures.86 The Worldwide Governance Indicators87 (WGI) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International can be used as criteria to assess the strength of institutions and place them in a comparative, international perspective.88 The “scope” of state functions refers to the extent of prerogatives or the catalogue of actions and goals that are taken on by the government (Fukuyama 2004a: 21). The 1997 World Development Report: The State in a Changing World, which Fukuyama uses as a basis of his analysis,89 classifies government functions along a continuum,90 and divides them into three groups: minimalist, intermediate, and activist (World Bank 1997: 27). Regarding “scope,” Fukuyama postulates that it is best to array states “according to the most ambitious functions which they seek to perform, even if they fail at or do not care much about the more basic ones” (Fukuyama 2004a: 22). The further to the right on the axis depicted in Figure 2 belong “the most ambitious” functions, the broader the scope, and vice versa. There is, however, an issue with this method to measure scope, which I shall address below.
Figure 2. The scope of state functions
Source: Fukuyama (2004a: 23).
Figure 3. Strength of state institutions and scope of state functions
Source: The figure builds on the discussion of these issues in Fukuyama (2004a: 23).
The four quadrants of Figure 3, which is based on the famous analysis of Fukuyama (Fukuyama 2004a: 23), represent different combinations of “strength” and “scope.” The purpose of the figure is to serve as a general orientation without claiming statistical or other precision. The American political scientist does not indicate the specific criteria that were used in order to position the countries in the appropriate quadrants.91 Bulgaria is not part of the original analysis. In Figure 3, I have compared the Balkan state with three of the countries in the analysis of Fukuyama—the United States, France, and Sierra Leone.92 In order to do that, I reconstructed the figure through the help of data describing the welfare regimes in the states in question (Fenger 2007) and the WGI for 2013. The study of welfare regimes essentially describes how the state performs regarding the most “ambitious functions” (if we use Fukuyama’s term) such as social security and income redistribution. Therefore, it allows us to “gauge” and compare scope. This criterion is particularly appropriate, because, as we have already seen, the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria are perceived as heavily dependent on the social security policies of the state.
In his classic work on social policy Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen93 distinguishes between three ideal types of welfare regimes94: liberal, conservative-corporatist, and social-democratic. This distinction is based on the degree of decommodification and the type of stratification, which they produce in given society95 (Esping-Andersen 1993). The liberal welfare states are characterized by means-tested assistance and modest social-insurance plans. Benefits cater predominantly to a clientele of low-income state dependents. If we apply this analysis to Fukuyama’s four quadrants (see Figure 3), we can conclude that, in comparison to the other two types, the states that favor this regime must embrace the ideal of limited scope. It is typical for countries like the United States, which are distinguished by parsimonious social security policies and a strong drive toward economic deregulation, based on the liberal faith in the “invisible hand” and, in general, animosity toward income redistribution. The conservative-corporatist regimes in France and Germany have moderate levels of decommodification. The state provides income maintenance benefits related to occupational status. The social-democratic regimes in Sweden and Norway are characterized by high levels of decommodification and redistribution. The generous benefits do not depend on any individual contributions (Esping Andersen 1993, Arts and Gelissen 2002).
This classification triggered a heated discussion, a plethora of new typologies, and received both prize and criticisms. What is important, from our perspective, is that two of the countries in question—the United States and France—“fit” relatively well into these ideal welfare regime types, which allows us to measure and compare their scope. However, neither Bulgaria nor Sierra Leone is part of Esping-Andersen’s classification. The Bulgarian case96 has been described as a mixture between the social-democratic and conservative-corporatist regimes (Todorova 2008). The hierarchical cluster analysis of Fenger97 which builds upon and expands the work of Esping-Andresen in order to classify the states in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates that Bulgaria is a part of a separate postcommunist European type (to which belong as well Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia).98 If we use the total government expenditures99 as a leading indicator, this cluster in fact must be positioned somewhat between the conservative and the liberal regimes. It should be noted, however, that according to Fenger’s analysis, the societies in the postcommunist European welfare regimes are more egalitarian than the conservative regimes.100 As to Bulgaria, this conclusion is apparently based on old data. The country’s Gini index measuring the distribution of family income and inequality is higher (rank 38, Gini index for 2007—45.3101) than any other state in the EU (e.g., France has rank 114, and Gini index for 2011—30.9102) and higher than the United States (rank 41, Gini index for 2007—45).103 The negative trends regarding some of the other social situation variables (such as inflation, life expectancy, infant mortality, and unemployment), as well as the main political participation variable (level of trust in the institutions) which Fenger takes into account104 in his analysis, pose significant challenges in front of operation of the welfare states of this type.
Regarding the institutional scope of Sierra Leone, the fourth country in our comparative analysis, it suffices to say that it is characterized by a permanent emergency welfare regime in transition (Cerami and Wagué 2013: 252–7). The latter is typical for the most of sub-Saharan Africa and has specific features, which make it very different from the welfare regimes that we examined above: a low impact of the state in welfare promotion due to limited budget capacity; political and bureaucratic clientelism in order to obtain access to benefits and services; high production of vertical and horizontal inequalities; vital importance of the family as well as the local and religious communities in social protection; strong reliance of the informal economy and informal networks in welfare production; welfare goals aiming at securing “basic services in provisions”; and survival-oriented skill production regime characterized by low human capital formation (Cerami 2013: 9–10). In a nutshell, the scope of state institutions in Sierra Leone is extremely limited.
Using the WGIs for 2013 (see Table 3 and), I compared the strength of state institutions in Bulgaria to these in France, Sierra Leone, and United States, as well as in Brazil and Turkey. Although the last two countries are not represented in Figure 3, they are given as examples of quadrant two countries in Fukuyama’s analysis105 and it makes sense to see how Bulgaria stands in juxtaposition to them. The indicators fluctuate in the range between −2.5 and 2.5; higher numbers indicate better performance. On the grounds of the indicators for 2013 we can conclude that, as far as “political stability and absence of violence/terrorism” and “regulatory quality” are concerned, Bulgarian institutions are doing a relatively good job (see Table 3 and Figure 4). The country follows the lead of the United States and France; it is ahead of Brazil, Turkey, and Sierra Leone. However, regarding the indicator “voice and accountability” Bulgaria lags behind France, United States, and Brazil. Bulgaria also runs behind the United States, France, and Turkey in the domain of “government effectiveness.” In addition to that, with respect to “control of corruption” and “rule of law” Bulgaria is at the bottom of the chart. The state capacity measured by these indicators is weaker only in Sierra Leone.
| Table 3. Comparison between six states in 2013, based on WGI Source: Kaufman et al. (2010) and World Bank (2015). | ||
| Indicator | Country | Governance score (from −2.5 to +2.5) |
| Voice and accountability | Brazil | 0.37 |
| Bulgaria | 0.32 | |
| France | 1.20 | |
| Sierra Leone | −0.39 | |
| Turkey | −0.26 | |
| United States | 1.08 | |
| Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism | Brazil | −0.28 |
| Bulgaria | 0.18 | |
| France | 0.42 | |
| Sierra Leone | −0.15 | |
| Turkey | −1.19 | |
| United States | 0.61 | |
| Government effectiveness | Brazil | −0.08 |
| Bulgaria | 0.15 | |
| France | 1.47 | |
| Sierra Leone | −1.14 | |
| Turkey | 0.37 | |
| United States | 1.50 | |
| Regulatory quality | Brazil | 0.07 |
| Bulgaria | 0.52 | |
| France | 1.15 | |
| Sierra Leone | −0.69 | |
| Turkey | 0.42 | |
| United States | 1.26 | |
| Rule of law | Brazil | −0.12 |
| Bulgaria | −0.14 | |
| France | 1.40 | |
| Sierra Leone | −0.88 | |
| Turkey | 0.08 | |
| United States | 1.54 | |
| Control of corruption | Brazil | −0.12 |
| Bulgaria | −0.29 | |
| France | 1.30 | |
| Sierra Leone | −0.90 | |
| Turkey | 0.11 | |
| United States | 1.28 | |
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