Studies in the Theory of Descent, Volume II

I have no intention of going any deeper into these questions. I mention them only in order to point out that even from this side there appears to me no obstacle in the way of a purely mechanical conception of the processes of the universe. The naturalist may be excused if he attempts to penetrate into the region of philosophy; it arises from the wish to be able to contribute a little towards the reconciliation of the latest knowledge of the naturalist with the religious wants of the human mind – towards the aim striven for by both sides, viz. a satisfactory and harmonious view of the universe, according with the state of knowledge of our time.

I believe that I have shown that the theory of selection by no means leads – as is always assumed – to the denial of a teleological Universal Cause and to materialism, and I thereby hope that I have cleared the way for this doctrine, the importance of which it is scarcely possible to over-estimate. Many, and not the most ill-informed, do not get so far as to make an unbiassed examination into the facts, because they are at the outset alarmed by the to them inevitable consequence of the materialistic conception of the universe. Mechanism and teleology do not exclude one another, they are rather in mutual agreement. Without teleology there would be no mechanism, but only a confusion of crude forces; and without mechanism there would be no teleology, for how could the latter otherwise effect its purpose?¹⁴⁴

Von Hartmann correctly says: – “The most complete mechanism conceivable is likewise the most completely conceivable teleology.” We may thus represent the phenomenal universe as such a completely conceivable mechanism. With this conception vanish all apprehensions that the new views would cause man to lose the best that he possesses – morality and purely human spiritual culture. He who, with Von Baer, considers the laws of nature as the “permanent expressions of the will of a creative principle,” will clearly perceive that a further advance in the knowledge of these laws need not divert man from the path of increasing improvement, but must further him in this course – that the knowledge of truth, whatever may be its purport, cannot possibly be considered a backward step. Let us take our stand boldly on the ground of new knowledge, and accept the direct consequences thereof, and we shall not be obliged to give up either morality or the comforting conviction of being part of an harmonious world, as a necessary member capable of development and perfection.

Any other mode of interference by a directive teleological power in the processes of the universe than by the appointment of the forces producing them, is however, at least to the naturalist, inadmissible. We are still far removed from completely understanding the mechanism by means of which the organic world is evoked – we still find ourselves at the very beginning of knowledge. We are, however, already convinced that both the organic and the inorganic worlds are dependent only upon mechanical forces, for to this conclusion we are led, not only by the results of investigators who have restricted themselves to limited provinces, but also by the most general considerations. But although the force of these arguments may not be acknowledged, and although one might maintain that the inductional proofs against the existence of a “phyletic vital force” have been directed only against points of detail, or have never been completely demonstrated, i. e. for all points, it must nevertheless be conceded, that for the naturalist the mechanical conception of Nature is the only one possible – that he is not at all justified in abandoning this view so long as the interference of teleological forces in the course of the processes of organic development has not been demonstrated to him. Thus, it will not be immaterial whether a conception of Nature which to many seems inevitable is consistent with the idea of universal design, or a final directive universal principle, since the value which we may attach to our own lives and aims, essentially depends thereon. The final and main result of this essay will thus be found in the attempted demonstration that the mechanical conception of Nature very well admits of being united with a teleological conception of the Universe.

THE END

ERRATA

Page 81, line 8 from top, and throughout essay, for “Daphnidæ” read “Daphniidæ.”

Page 95, line 3 from bottom, for “Daphnoidea” read “Daphniacea.”

Page 166, line 7 from bottom (note), for “p. 438” read “p. 433.”

Page 245, line 17 from bottom (note), for “Ställ” read “Stoll.”

Page 263, after the word “insects” (bottom line of note), add, “but the whole marking is suggestive of distastefulness.”

Page 296, line 3 from bottom, for “Stähelina – collector” read “Stähelin – a collector.”

Page 305, line 5 from bottom (note), for “In 1869” read “In 1865.”

Page 434, bottom line of note, for “Geometræ” read “Bombycidæ.”

Page 494, line 2 from top, for “from which a larval form” read “from a larval form which.”

Page 542, line 12 from top, for “Dione Vanilla” read “Dione Vanillæ.”

Page 544, line 15 from bottom, for “Siderome” read “Siderone.”