A new look at the Russian February Revolution of 1917

Has Nicholas II signed the Manifesto of Abdication?

In recent years (after 2012) in Russia, the version that Nicholas II did not actually sign the Manifesto of Abdication was distributed there. Really, what he had signed March 2 in Pscov, it it was not the oficial Manifesto of Abdication. Instead it, the conspirators used the telegram of the Sovereign to the chief of staff Alekseev, which, in fact, was only a draft document, and it was deliberately signed by him (the Emperor) in pencil. But next day and nevermore later he did not challenge the Manifesto published on his behalf – in order not to split the army.

There is another important detail. When, on March 3, the former tsar found out about the refusal of the Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich from the throne, he probably wanted to change the text of his abdication in favor of his son, Alexei. General AI Denikin claimed in his memoirs that on March 3 in Mogilev Nikolai Alexandrovich said General Alekseev:

"I changed my mind. I ask you to send this telegram to Petrograd. On the piece of paper in a distinct handwriting the emperor wrote with his own hand about his consent to the accession to the throne of his son Alexei … General Alekseev took off the telegram and … did not send it. It was too late: the country and the army had already been announced two manifestos (on the abdication of Nicholas II and Mikhail's refusal). This telegram of Nicholas, Alekseev, for "to not confuse the minds", did not show to anyone, kept in his wallet and gave it to me at the end of May, leaving the supreme command." [General AI Denikin. Revolution and the royal family / / Essays on the Russian Troubles. Volume One, Issue One – Paris, 1921, p. 54]

… It is known the text of famous Soviet journalist Mikhail Koltsov (who was free in 1927) in an introductory article to the book by D.S. Botkin's "Renunciation of Nicholas II." I quote from [71]: "Koltsov was then in the camp of the victors, those who exterminated the Romanovs "as a class," who slandered and demeaned the memory of the last Tsar in every possible way. On this fone there is especially unexpected Koltsov's conclusion when he writes about Nicholas II: "Where is the rag? Where is the icicle? Among the frightened defenders of the throne, we see only one true person – Nicholas himself – no doubt the only person who tried to persist in preserving the monarchical regime was the monarch himself, only the Tsar himself tried to save and defend the monarchy. Not he destroyed all around, he was ruined." [71, Chapter 6, s.528]

About "the terrified crowd of defenders of the throne" , Koltsov is not still right: March 1-2, none of the faithful to the Oath of the Emperor suite in the train was not afraid – they just could not take or do anything without his order, – and he already knew that to anything other than bloodshed, it will not. Many of the suite were frightened a week later, on March 9, on a train from Mogilev to Tsarskoe Selo – when they learned that Nicholas is traveling on this train "as if arrested" (according to Alexeyev's expression before boarding a train in Mogilev). And that on the eve in Tsarskoe Selo Kornilov arrested Alexandra Feodorovna and all those who voluntarily stayed with her in the Alexander Palace.

The victorious conspirators even six days after their victory, even on March 8, they feared Nikolay – they did not even dare to publish in the newspapers his last order for the army and navy, which he announced at parting with the troops at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander in Mogilev [104]

Although this order called for submission to the Provisional Government, but the victorious conspirators feared that his publication would be followed by a wave of sympathy for Nicholas. And they had reason to fear it. At the farewell to the troops, according to eyewitness recollections, the atmosphere was such that it seemed, if Nikolai would tell at least a word against the Provisional Government or against the conspirators, everyone in the hall would immediately stand by his side, and bloodshed would begin. But he did not say – because he did not want a split in the army and huge trouble in Russia.

Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich describes the farewell of Nicholas with the officers of the staff so:

"By eleven o'clock the hall is full: generals, officers of headquarters and chief officers and persons of the suite. Niki enters, calm, restrained, with something resembling a smile on his lips, thanking the staff and asking everyone to continue their work "with the same zeal and ready to sacrifice He asks everyone to forget the enmity, to serve Russia's faith and truth, and to lead our army to victory." Then he utters his farewell words with short military phrases, avoiding pathetic words; his modesty makes an enormous impression on the audience: we shout "hurray" more than ever did yet shout for twenty-three years. Old generals are crying. Once more moment – and someone will come forward and beg Nicky to change his decision. But in vain: the autocrat of the All-Russia does not take his words back!" [21]

It should be recalled that the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich was main liberal among all the great princes, and that up to the abdication he was the main critic Nicholas II.

14 (27) in March 1917, General Alexeyev in a note by the Interim Government sums up the reaction of the military fronts and fleets in the rsar's abdication: the Baltic Fleet: "the news of the abdication was met with enthusiasm", in the Northern front – "with restraint and calm," in the West front – "quietly, seriously; many with regret and disappointment", in the South-West front – "calmly and with knowledge of the importance of the present moment", in Romanian and Caucasian fronts, and also on the Black Sea fleet – "a painful impression, worship of high patriotism and self-sacrifice of the Sovereign Which was expressed in the act of abdication." [71 Conclusion to register]

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In the conclusion of our notes of tsar's abdication, add a few touches to the portrait of Nicholas II and his behavior in this trap.

2nd of March. Arrival from Petrograd Guchkov and Shulgin. I quote from the book of General S.V. Pozdnyshev "Crucify Him," published in Paris in 1952 [86]:

<<The young officer of the Life Guards of the Moscow Regiment looked with hatred at Guchkov. Here he grabbed his sword, "maybe now the steel will shine." The Tsar noticed the movement of the officer's hand, quickly said: "Solovev, calm down and go into the next room. I do not want anyone's blood."

As if from a depth of two millennia another picture arose, and the wind of the centuries brought from the darkness of the Garden of Gethsemane: "Peter, put your sword in your sheath." No less impressive is the behavior of the Tsar with Alekseev after abdication, in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander in Mogilev:

Alekseev felt uneasy and embarrassed near the Emperor. His conscience was troubled by the Tsar's stubborn silence. During the report on the latest events in Petrograd, he could not resist and said to him: "Your Majesty, I acted these days, guided by my love for the Motherland and the desire to protect the army from collapse. Russia is seriously ill, for her salvation it was necessary to go on sacrifices … " The Tsar looked at him intently and did not answer. >> [86].

Did not Judas justify his betrayal simillary manner, was not the Savior silent before Pilate? The behavior of Emperor Nicholas II as a Christian sovereign testifies that the Tsar offered a sacrifice in the name of Russia, but did not renounce it. Nicholas II was very far from political trickery and intrigues.

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All this refutes the widespread misconception that Nicholas II "showed cowardice" in the abdication of March 2 (15), 1917. Nicholas II was the last moral ruler of Russia. He was not an ideal leader and ruler, but he was the last moral and best ruler of Russia in the entire twentieth century and still.

LITERATURE

(To my book "The Emperor who knew the fate, and Russia that did not know"):

In English:

A Handy Reference on the Great War.  By Frederic L. Paxson, Edward S. Corwin,  Samuel R. Harding and  Guy Stanton Ford. Washington (USA): Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation of the Committee on Public Information, 1918.  (War Cyclopedia – N,  Nicholas II) (http://www.ww1accordingtobob.com/wcN.php )

Aleksejev V., The last act a tragedy: new documents about the execution of the last Russian emperor Nicholas II – Yekaterinburg: Urals Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, 1996.

Arthur L. Frothingham, Handbook of War Facts and Peace Problems. N-Y: Committee on organized education National security league. National security league, 19 West 44th Street New York, 1919 (http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/WarFacts/wfactsTC.htm )

Henry Van Dyke, Fighting for peace.  New York: Charles Scribner's sons. 1917 ) (P. 132-133)

James M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case. A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia, France, Austria, Italy and Belgium. N-Y, L.: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York and London, 1915 (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/31457/31457-h/31457-h.htm ) (P. 81, 106)